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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
A

-

An Overview of the Concept of Action and the
Problem of the Pariah

Hannah Arendt's political thought probes

a

variety of

themes that originate in ancient Greece and Rome, extend
in-o the American revolutionary period, and continue through
the contemporary 20th century era.

If one can make a

generalization about her vast body of work, it is
problematic both in its suggestiveness and elusivity, and
for these reasons, provokes varied critiques.

It is

difficult to categorize Arendt's work because it does not
fall easily into any school or system of thought.

Arendt

did not leave behind any disciples, although her students

were influenced considerably by her thought

.[ 1

]

Critics

have been frustrated in their attempts to categorize

Arendt's work. [2]
(

She advocates self-thinking

selbstdenken) which she characterizes in

a

letter to

Gershom Scholem on the Eichmann controversy:
What confuses you is that my arguments and
my approach are different from what you are
used to; in other words, the trouble is that
By this I mean, on the one
I am independent.
hand, that I do not belong to any organization
and always speak only for myself, and on the
other hand, that I have great confidence in
Lessing's selbstdenken for which, I think, no
ideology, no public opinion, and no 'convictions'
can ever be a substitute .[ 3

Arendt's self -thinking is what makes her thought so rigorous
and challenging.

Her self-thinking, unique phenomenological

method,

and generally idiosyncratic view of politics cause

her to defy classification even further.
a

Her work examines

number of different themes: action, totalitarianism, "the

Jewish question," revolution, violence, thinking, willing,
and judging.

Exploring the possibilities and potentialities

of political action constitutes a pervasive and major thread
in her work.

In The Human Condition she seeks to provide a

theoretical grounding for these possibilities.

In this

study, Arendt maintains that action was not given its due in
the traditional hierarchy of western metaphysics in which

the vita contemplativa (the life of the mind)

over the vita activa (the life of action).

is

privileged

Arendt argues

that the Platonic philosopher's withdrawal from the world is

fundamentally anti-political in its isolation from the space
of appearances.

For many critics, commentators, and students of

political theory, Hannah Arendt's most significant

contribution and the one with which they seek to come to
terms,

is her account of action and the political

.

[4

]

Most

examine the role that action plays in revolution, founding,
and constitution-making in On Revolution
in totalitarian regimes,

,

its noted absence

and Arendt's rigid separation of

action and politics from the social question.

But the

question and problem of the pariah is found nowhere in this
critical corpus.

The pariah,

a

concept and characterization

Arendt develops in the essay "The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden

Tradition" is one that has not received much attention from

3

her critics.

As a significant theme and a focus of

legitimate inquiry, the pariah has been a conspicuous
omission from scholarly treatments of Arendt
what follows,

I

'

s

work. [5]

in

will establish the pariah's importance in

the context of her thought and explore the possibilities for

the pariah's relationship to political action.

Arendt's exploration of the pariah,

a

marginal person

who does not fully "belong" anywhere leads to

problematic in her work.

a

central

Her theory of action places

inestimable importance on acting in the world, the public
For Arendt, acting and speaking among others in the

space.

realm of appearances affirms our common humanity and assures
the emergence of unique identity.

In her terms,

acting

politically preserves the specifically human character of
the world,

its diversity and artifacts.

Thus given Arendt's

account of action, how do pariahs who occupy positions

outside the world, estranged from it, ever become viable
Restated: can the pariah overcome estrangement and

actors?

become

a

political actor/participant in the public realm,

while also maintaining a unique collective identity?

I

will

examine whether the pariah's collective identity as

elaborated by Arendt, meshes with the characteristics of her
citizen/actor in order to determine whether pariahs can
"act" in an Arendtian sense.

My question, then, is: what is

the relationship between the pariah and action?

The problem of the pariah manifests itself within the

context of Arendt's concern for action and worldliness.

4

This concern requires that human beings belong to, and

become situated in the world.
the political outsider,

The problem of the pariah, or

raises particular concerns for

Arendt's theory of action which privileges caring for the

world by acting in the public realm.

In Arendt's thought

the pariah is a political outcast who has no access to the

public space, the arena that encourages the expression and

affirmation of individual and group identities.

For Arendt,

the public space is the all-important life-affirming,

preserver of humanity.
In this study,

I

will demonstrate how the concept of

the pariah informs Arendt's theory of political action and

will determine which of its elements contribute to the

relationship of the two.

Speech,

language itself, provides

the most significant conceptual link between the pariah and

political action.

The challenge is to elucidate what might

constitute the pariah's action and how these qualities might
be transferred into the public realm.

Without access to the

public space, the pariah, an individual without political or
social status, becomes a contradiction to Arendt's theory.
In a sense, Arendt offers her own antidote to the problem of

the pariah in her belief that no individual can live and

achieve a truly human identity without belonging to some

political community.

It is precisely for this reason that

will argue that we must view Arendt's theory of political

action in terms of the pariah.

I

5

Arendt

s

work on the pariah and other Jewish themes

leads up to her consideration of action and plays an

important role in formulating her theory.

Her insistence on

viewing issues such as the Jewish question in political,
rather than social or assimilationist terms, underscores it
as an essential component in her theory of action.

B

.

Who is the Pariah?

In "The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition" Arendt

distinguishes between the conscious pariahs, or the Jews who
were aware of their marginal status both in Jewish society
and in relation to European culture, and the parvenus who at
best, are accepted only as exceptions.

Ron Feldman

characterizes the situation of the conscious pariah in the
following way:

By affirming both their Jewish particularity
and their right to a place in general European
life, the conscious pariahs became marginal
not only in relation to European society -as all Jews were -- but to the Jewish community
as well
6
.

[

Arendt probes the lives and works of several conscious
pariahs: Bernard Lazare, Heinrich Heine, Franz Kafka, Rosa

Luxemburg, Rahel Varnhagen, and Isak Dinesen among several
others.

Arendt

'

s

pariahs are primarily literary, cultural,

intellectual, and political figures whose gifts and

achievements she recognizes as enduring, and whose projects
are enriched by the consciousness and wisdom that is the

gift

of a marginalized existence.

The women pariahs

Arendt describes illuminate not only what it means to
straddle two worlds at once, but several.

They inhabit the

world of the pariah, confront the dominant culture, and

belong to

a

milieu of intellectual women which because of

its small size,

results in an even more peripheral and

marginalized status than their less intellectually oriented
counterparts.

The women pariahs hover on the periphery

attempting to gain foothold inside the public realm, but
they mostly live outside of it, circulating within the

private sphere.

Arendt 's portrait of Rosa Luxemburg proves

to be an exception to this rule however.

Gaining status and

legitimacy are hard enough for the male pariah, let alone
the female pariah's struggle for recognition.

Arendt

's

analysis of two women pariahs, Rahel Varnhagen and Rosa

Luxemburg, reveals the complications of the pariah's
dilemma.

It also becomes an illumination,

and in part, a

reflection on her own pariah status as a German- Jewish woman
intellectual and refugee living in the particularly volatile
times of World War II Europe.
As stated earlier, of the several book length studies

on Arendt

's

political thought, none confront the role of the

pariah and thus, do not attempt to situate the concept in
Current scholarship fails to give

the context of her work.

any serious attention to the concept of the pariah.

But

when it does address the issue, it only takes it into
account as part of Arendt

'

s

Jewish writings, failing to

7

confront the concept's subtleties and potential
significance
to the theory of action.

Critics fail to see Arendt's

theory of political action, individuals appearing before
one
another as equals in the public realm with words and deeds,
as inextricably linked with her elaboration on the

experience of Jewishness in the modern age.

The history of

post-Emancipation Jews' exclusion from European society,
their marginality, and inability to become full and equal

participants in the public realm, significantly informs
Arendt's vision of the political.

Arendt is highly critical

of the long history of Jewish exclusion and estrangement

from the political realm and argues, moreover, that Jews

must assume

share of caring for the world.

a

The pariah

must, she maintains, establish and claim political and legal

identities in order to share

a

stake in the world.

Arendt

vehemently opposes social solutions to the Jewish question
foster only an assimilationist

that at best,

mentality

—

a

cosmetic change.

,

parvenu

Her analysis suggests that

the pariah can have access to the public realm and find

a

home in the world with an awakening of consciousness.
1

.

Public v. Private, Political

v.

Social

Arendt's view of the Jewish question as inherently

political stems from her strict separation of the public
from the private realm, and the political from the social.

This profound distinction turns on the Greek notion of

freedom v. necessity: freedom sets the stage for politics,

acting and speaking among one's equals in the space of

3

appearances.

The private realm corresponds with necessity

comprised of emotions, as well as activities of
production and consumption, all of which are fundamentally
anti-political

Arendt's public sphere is comprised of freedom, action,
speech, and memory;

it is a privileged realm for citizen-

actors to come together to talk about things that cannot be

figured out with certainty.

This brings into focus the

crucial distinction Arendt draws between the political and
the social.

For Arendt, matters of distributive justice and

socio-economic equality are not the stuff of politics, but

belong to

a

social or administrative sphere.

Because social

welfare issues have to do with producing and consuming, or
the realm of necessity, they are fundamentally anti-

political, and are therefore, not within the purview of

Arendt's higher order politics.

Arendt's politics includes theorizing, storytelling,
narrativity, recovery, and remembrance, all of which

illuminate experience, its meaning, and political identity.
Leon Botstein comments that Arendt's notion of politics

would require the very skills which had
flourished among Jews in their pariah experience,
namely, thinking and speaking. A political
renaissance for modernity which utilized
the traditions of the Jewish pariah became
Arendt's normative objective for collective
If political
life in the modern world.
the use of
on
action could be centered
language, then the once pariah European Jew
could emerge as an exemplar of political
participation [7
.

]

9

BotSL-ein argues that Arendt's views on speech
as political

action were formulated through her exploration of "the
Jewish question" and her attempt to find

a

ional Jewish impotence and exclusion.

way out of
He asserts that

The European history of the Jewish pariah, the legacy of a

people without a home or politics, became in Arendt

political action in the ideal: the Jewish experience
generalized.

"

[8

]

Arendt’s search for the inclusion of the

pariah in political life and her attempts to preserve the
unique character of European secular Jewry have an affinity

with current contemporary political realities in Eastern and
Central Europe.

The pariah as the political outsider is

related to the dissident.

Both are in need of access to the

public space; both lack status and a sense of legitimacy and
are potential contributors to the enrichment of politics.

Currently in Eastern and Central Europe, the pariah as
dissident is in the forefront of the political scene and has
risen to the leadership ranks.

As political actors who are

now free to act and openly in the public space, these former

political outcasts exemplify the spirit of the conscious
pariah Arendt privileges.
2

.

The Pariah’s Stance and Experience
In her essay "From The Pariah's Point Of View:

Reflections On Hannah Arendt's Life And Work," Elisabeth

Young-Bruehl provides further insight into Arendt's

perspective on the pariah.

She states:

10

The pariah's task, in Arendt’s understanding,
was
to be alert to the unexpected, to look at how
things and events appear without preconceptions
about history's course or pattern, to avoid
sacrificing the outsider's perspective for the
parvenu's comforts. [9]

Pariahs'

independent stances provide them with

a fresh,

critical perspective enabling them to respond to situations
as they arise.

The pariah's response possesses

a

kind of

distance and detachment, but it also has an ethical

embeddedness that emerges from

political exclusion.

a

history of social and

This independent stance amounts to

pariahs living as rebels among their own people and the rest
of society.

In what follows,

I

will explore how such a

stance might compel the pariah to act politically, in an

Arendtian fashion.
Arendt
war years,

'

a

s

own experience as a refugee during the inter-

person whose legal, political, and social

identities were confused for a time, taught her that the
chances for freedom, no matter how slim and precarious must
be pursued. [10]

The elements of spontaneity and

precariousness which characterize Arendtian action are such
that one never knows which way things might go, but Arendt 's

analysis suggests that the risks inherent in action are

worth it.
bleak,

For Arendt, the alternative to action, is a

stasized mass society.

The qualities of the pariah as thinker, speaker,

independent critic, and judge have something in common with
those Arendt sees in action.

For Arendt, action is

11

conditional, tentative, contingent, and spontaneous.

Where

the conditions for action flourish, human beings can

participate in, and experience the creation of new
beginnings.

The opportunity to build freedom exists in

a

world in which the possibilities for political action are

cultivated and preserved.
If the creation of freedom is an essential goal of

political action, it is also one of the unique qualities of
the pariah.

interests,

The pariah is free from the pull of specific
factions, or parties, from biases, ideologies,

and other keenly held passions.

The pariah responds

uniquely to each new situation and takes the risk of
independent thought unhampered by conventions, tending to
offer radical assessments of political matters.

The

challenge lies in whether the pariah can channel these

characteristics into the public realm to help establish

a

political identity and a basis for public freedom.

Arendt's concept of the political seeks to allow
individuals the space to appear as who they are in all their

particularity.

Similarly, she advances the idea that the

Jew as pariah should appear as the representative of the

pariah in the public realm without renouncing the collective
pariah identity.

The conscious pariah is her example of the

way in which Jews might participate in political life.

As

stated earlier, Arendt remains extremely critical of Jews'

assimilationist tendencies and efforts to hide or change
their identities.

The pariah must assume

a

share of

I
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responsibility tor sustaining the world, and this can
only
be achieved by joining the public realm.

inherent in Arendt

1

s

The potentiality

characterization of action and

natality, the prospect of creating something heretofore
unseen, reflects her sense of hope for the future of the

public realm.
a

-

The Pariah’s Potential for Action

.

As previously

stated, the central paradox of the pariah lies in the fact

that such an individual does not fully belong anywhere and

occupies

a

position outside of the world.

This outsider

status runs counter to the significance Arendt places on

being situated "in" the world, of not being estranged from
it,

and the importance of acting in a plurality.

She is

concerned with amor mundi, or love of the world, and seeks
to enrich the possibilities for authentic political action.

Free and unburdened by care for the world, it would seem

that on the surface, the pariah would not be the kind of

political actor Arendt envisions.

I

will work through this

problem to determine whether the pariah can be "in" the

world in an Arendtian sense.
Chapter Two attempts to offer a critical interpretation
of Arendt 's theory of action and will explore her

characterization of the political.

Chapter Three focuses on

the concept of the pariah -- how it emerges in the context
of her thought and whether its characteristics fulfill the

requirements of action as elaborated by Arendt.

The study

will conclude with some thoughts on the potential for

a

13

relationship between action and the pariah.

I

will also

offer some tentative reflections on the concept of the

pariah

s

significance to the unfolding contemporary

political realities in Eastern and Central Europe.
Given the momentous changes that have occurred in this
part of the world and the resulting dramatic shifting of

political configurations, it seems especially fitting to

rediscover and reflect on Hannah Arendt's work.

I

think

that Arendt would have reveled in these revolutionary times
of founding, with the toppling of Communist parties and

regimes and the growth of non-violent peoples' movements.
She had great hope for the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and
the reformist mood of the 1968 Prague Spring.

If she were

alive today, she would have applauded the courageousness of
the people involved in the current efforts to break the

Communist Party's monopoly on power.

Arendt would have

regarded the daily spectacle of people demonstrating for

political and economic reforms as an act of liberation,

breaking with the old to usher in

a

a

revolution that would

establish the framework for a founding.

That members of the

opposition and leading dissidents are leading new coalition
governments, points to the potential significance of the

pariah for invigorating and sustaining
space.

space,

a

viable public

For Arendt, people claiming public power,

a

public

and holding spontaneous demonstrations, constitutes

political action and functions to preserve the revolutionary
spirit in everyday life.

Arendt encapsulates this spirit as

14

"the eagerness to liberate and to build a
new house where

freedom can dwell. "[11]
It is my belief that a study of Arendt

1

s

concept of the

pariah understood in relation to her theory of action
is

deepened when considered against the background of recent
political events.

Today the fruits of action and the

unexpected are culled in places we might never have dreamed
were possible.

It is,

rediscovered Arendt'
and new beginnings

s

then, my good fortune to have

thought during

a

period of revolution

15

Notes
1.

Lewis Coser remarks:

Arendt left no disciples, though political theorists
such as Sheldon Wolin, George Kateb, and John
Schaar
have testified to the impact of her thought on their
own.
She did not wish to found a 'school' or a sect,
but she intended to reopen the dialogue, inside and
outside the academy.
Lewis Coser, Refugee Scholars In America - Their impart
and Their Experiences
(New Haven and London- vaio
University Press, 1984), p. 196.
,

Elizabeth Minnich in "Hannah Arendt: Thinking As We Are"
also attests to Arendt 's profound influence on her work.
Between Women ed. Carol Ascher, Louise DeSalvo, and Sara
Ruddick, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), pp. 171-85.
,

2.
In response to a question about how she defines herself
politically, Arendt states:
I don't really know.
I really don't know and I've
never known... You know the left think that I am
conservative, and the conservatives sometimes think
that I am left or I am a maverick, or God knows what.
And I must say I couldn't care less.
I don't think
that the real questions of this century will get any
kind of illumination by this kind of thing.

She also states: "So you ask me where I am.
I am
nowhere.
I am really not in the mainstream of present or
any other political thought.
But not because I want to
be so original--it so happens that I somehow don't fit."

"Hannah Arendt: On Hannah Arendt," in Hannah Arendt:
The Recovery Of The Public World ed. Melvyn A. Hill (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 333-36.
,

Hannah Arendt, "'Eichmann in Jerusalem' - An Exchange of
Letters between Gershom Scholem and Hannah Arendt," in
The Jew As Pariah ed. by Ron H. Feldman (New York: Grove
Press, Inc., 1978), p. 250.
3.

,

Among the most significant book length studies which
address Arendt 's concept of political action in her
political theory are: Stephen J. Whitfield, Into the Dark:
Hannah Arendt and Totalitarianism (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1980); Margaret Canovan, The Political
Thought of Hannah Arendt, (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.,
1974); George Kateb, Hannah Arendt - Politics, Conscience,
(Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983); and
Evil
4.

,

,
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Bhikhu Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Sea rch for
a New
Political Ph ilosophy (Atlantic Highlands, New JerseyHumanities Press, 1981).
Also significant to the steadily increasing body
of
literature on her work is a special issue of Social
Research
44 (Spring 1977
which was devoted entirely to Arendt
shortly after her death, and several essays in Salmagundi
60
(Spring-Summer 1983).
,

)

A symposium called "Arendt, Politics, And The Self
appears in Political Theory 16 (February 1988): 77-98.
Each
of the three commentators examines pertinent aspects of
Arendt' s later work in the Life of the Mind series.
Sevla
Benhabib on "Judgment And The Moral Foundations of Politics
In Arendt' s Thought," Suzanne Jacobitti offers "Hannah
Arendt And The Will," and B. Honig on "Arendt, Identity, And
Difference."
These essays confront Arendt 's investigations
into the activity of thinking and develop her concept of
judgment as a moral faculty. They also examine the role of
the will in engendering possibilities for action and
consider it in relation to the potential suggested by the
Arendtian self. More specifically, these works debate the
constituent elements of this self and the potential for its
exercising action.
5.
The only treatments of Arendt s development of the
pariah that I am aware of are by Ron Feldman in his
introduction to The Jew As Pariah "The Jew as Pariah: The
Case of Hannah Arendt," pp 15-52, Leon Botstein in
"Liberating The Pariah: Politics, The Jews, and Hannah
Arendt," Salmagundi 60 (Spring-Summer 1983), pp. 73-105, and
in Elisabeth Young-Bruehl s mammoth biography of Arendt
entitled, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1982).
'

,

.

'

6.

p.

Feldman, "The Jew as Pariah: The Case of Hannah Arendt,"
18.

7.

Botstein, "Liberating The Pariah," p. 79.

8.

Botstein, "Liberating The Pariah," p. 95.

9.
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, "From The Pariah's Point Of
View: Reflections On Hannah Arendt's Life And Work," in
Hannah Arendt: The Recovery Of The Public World ed. Melvyn
A. Hill (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), p. 4
,

Several of Arendt's commentators have stated that Arendt
may be viewed as a conscious pariah, or the politically
I will
conscious Jew that she privileges over the parvenu.
substantiate
pariah
or
conscious
not establish Arendt as a
such claims, but rather, I intend to explore how the concept
of the pariah itself, as it is elaborated by Arendt, is
10.
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sig nifi c a nt to her theory of political
action; how
qualities inherent in the pariah may create a model the
of
action.

Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Ron Feldman, Elizabeth
Minnich
and Lewis Coser all characterize Arendt as a
conscious
pariah, examining the intersection of her life and
her
political theory.
The authors point out that Arendt was
even a pariah among her own people with regard to the
Eichmann controversy and the on-going debate over the state
of Israel and Zionism.
Feldman argues in his introduction
t0 The Jew As Pariah that Arendt saw herself as a
conscious
pariah and that this dynamic guided her approach to the
Jewish question and her work on political action. He
states
Arendt' s solution to her own 'Jewish problem' was
not to repudiate her Jewishness nor blindly affirm
it, but to adopt the stance of a conscious pariah
an outsider among non- Jews, and a rebel among
her own people,
it was because of this marginal
position that she was able to gain critical insights
into both the Jewish and non- Jewish worlds.

Feldman sees a dialectical tension between Arendt's
understanding of modern Jewish history and her Jewish
identity which she never renounces, and her sense of
cultural and historical location in a German/European
heritage which gives her a unique theoretical vantage point
Feldman, "The Jew as Pariah: The Case of Hannah Arendt," pp
19

11.

and 47.

Hannah Arendt, On Revolution,

1977), p.

35.
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CHAPTER II
ACTION ARENDTIAN STYLE
The Elements of Action

A.

Freedom... is not only one among the many
problems and phenomena of the political
realm properly speaking, such as justice,
or
power, or equality; freedom, which only
seldom in times of crisis or revolution-becomes the direct aim of political action,
is actually the reason that men live together
in political organization at all.
without
it, political life as such would be meaningless.
The raison d'etre of politics is freedom, and
its field of experience is action. [1]

—

Most of Hannah Arendt's work hinges on the importance
she attributes to political action.

Her theory of action

can be considered the centerpiece of her contribution to

political theory.
what she views as

In The Human Condition Arendt addressess
a

profound need to examine the components

of action, the distinctions between them, and their

preversions in the modern age.

In order to establish the

role of the pariah in her thought, which is the focus of my
study,

it is first necessary to confront Arendt's account of

action and politics.

considered

a

This account will illuminate what is

major focus in her thought, and will provide an

idea of what the pariah's potential is for becoming a

political actor.
In The Human Condition

,

Arendt illuminates the key

components and activities that define the human condition:
labor, work,

and action.

Labor,

says Arendt,

is

associated

with the biological process, and mere survival, thus, with
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itself.’ [2]

in contrast, work relates to the
unnaturalness

of human existence and consists of artifice
and contributing
to the world of objects and things:

worx is worldliness

."[ 3

]

"The human condition of

Action, to which she attributes

tne most potential and significance, occurs directly
between

individuals with no intermediaries and corresponds to the
human condition of plurality.

While all three activities

are related to politics, plurality is the defining

characteristic of all political life for Arendt.

Politics,

speaking and acting among others, seeing and being seen,
depends on the condition of plurality: "doing" politics
takes more than one person.

Thus action and plurality are

partners -- action requires plurality as Arendt states:
Action. .. corresponds to the human condition of
plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the
earth and inhabit the world... this condition of
plurality is specifically the condition ... of ail
political life 4
.

[

Together, the triptych of labor, work, and action,
relate to natality and mortality: the continuum of the human
condition.

While labor is crucial for guaranteeing

individual and species survival, and work provides

a

permanence to human artifacts which outlast human life,
action,

the most celebrated of the three by Arendt, binds us

to political life,

"in so far as it engages in founding and

preserving political bodies [and] creates the condition for
remembrance, that is, for history. "[5]
(labor, work,

and action)

But all three,

are rooted in the concept of
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natality which is life-affirming and continuous,
"in so far
as they have the task to provide and
preserve the world for,
to foresee and reckon with, the constant
influx of newcomers
who are born into the world as strangers ."[
of
6

]

the

three, however, Arendt says that action has the
strongest

connection to the human condition of natality:
...the new beginning inherent in birth can make
itself felt in the world only because the newcomer
possesses the capacity of beginning something anew,
that is, of acting.
in this sense of initiative,
an element of action, and therefore of natality/
is inherent in all human activities .[ 7
Thus,

just as action is her quintessential political

activity and category, natality becomes the fertile ground
on which Arendt

'

s

political thought rests.

Natality is the

well-spring of action because just by virtue of being born,
each individual has the capacity and the potential to

initiate something new, unprecedented, and political.

According to Arendt, all new action has the potential to be
political.

By nature, action is

a

political, and therefore

public disclosure of identity in the presence of others.
Action, perpetually inspired by natality, is the main

category in Arendt

'

s

politics.

While action is rooted in natality, Arendt asserts that

mortality and the preoccupation with eternity are the
central features of traditional philosophical thought.

Arendt claims that the vita activa,

a

life devoted to the

public realm, has suffered from an inferior status

throughout the ages since it has been seen from the
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perspective of the vita contemplativa

contemplating beauty and eternity.

,

the life devoted to

The split between

traditional philosophical thought and politics
originates in
Plato, but Arendt traces the distinction
specifically
to

Aristotle who conceived of bioi (life) as freedom
from the
necessities of life. Aristotle understood freedom as
independence from the work of keeping oneself alive.
Therefore, the slave's labor and the craftsman's

acquisitiveness did not permit them to enjoy bioi.

Labor

and work produced the necessary and the useful, thus they

were deemed unfree activities.

For Aristotle, life

consisted of any of the following three things: enjoyment of
the beautiful and of bodily pleasures, a life devoted to the

polis and beautiful deeds, and the life of the philosopher

who contemplates the eternal.

Thus,

in Aristotle we see the

seeds sown for the emergence of the vita contemplativa

superiority.

'

Arendt notes that with the disintegration of

the Roman Empire and the rise of Christianity, the vita

activa was set back further.

Arendt views most of political philosophy since Plato
as the justification for "an escape from politics

altogether ."[ 8

]

The escape,

she says,

is based on the

belief that a political community can be maintained only if
some people rule and others are ruled and obey.

The notion

of ruling and being ruled is based on the master/slave

relationship which Arendt believes precludes any possibility
of action.

For Arendt,

such a concept of rulership fueled

the "suspicion of action... and arose from the earnest
desire
to find a substitute for action rather than from any

irresponsible or tyrannical will to power. "[9]

Plato

substituted rulership for action and since Platonic times,
"making" and fabrication have been substituted for action,

thereby degrading action as an instrumentalizing process and
"politics as

a

means for something else." [10]

In addition,

Arendt is critical of Plato's abolition of the private
character of the household which is class-specific, applying
only to the Guardians.

While the Guardian class has no

traditional family life or private property, the other
classes maintain the "amenities" of the private realm.

Arendt believes that Plato's communalization of property
results in a dangerous encroachment into the public realm,

which she clearly privileges.

The entry of the private, or

the social into the public constitutes,

for Arendt,

a

serious threat to the possibility of a viable politics.

Arendt is equally as adamant about the Platonic elimination
of private property, which she regards as an extension of

the family into one so-called "household."

This phenomenon

leads to the creation of society, which she says, results in
a nation of households.

And for Arendt, the household is

tied to necessity and to mere survival.
Ey the Middle Ages, Arendt claims that the vita

contemplativa

'

s

status as the only truly free way of life

was securely established; to be free from politics meant to
be free from the necessities of life.

Arendt contends that
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the vita activa's inferiority is inferred from its
Greek

derivation, askholia, meaning "unquiet."

in contrast,

philosophy's experience of the eternal induces
speechlessness and quiet.

a

kind of

The Platonic view of

contemplation's superiority stems from the belief that the
realm of human affairs is uncertain and unreliable and that

nothing humanly made "can equal in beauty and truth the
physical kosmos, which swings in itself in changeless

eternity without any interference or assistance from
outside ..." [11

Arendt brings this philosophical aversion

]

to the frailty of human affairs to our attention in her

criticism of the hierarchy at work in the western

philosophical tradition.
The vita activa involves introducing

permanence and
affairs.

a

a

standard of

potential for immortality into human

This standard lies in the belief that mortals'

greatness is grounded in their ability to produce great
deeds, words, and things which transcend and endure through

history and story-telling.

Arendt understands action as

stories about deeds recorded for remembrance.

As Arendt

relates, the striving for immortality by mere mortals in

ancient times "had been the spring and center of the vita
activa. "[12]

Such events and artifacts of human history as

revolution and founding occur in the sphere of action in

a

plurality rather than in isolation and withdrawal from
others.

The most important requirement of action is

plurality and as Arendt asserts persistently throughout her

writing,

the world consists not of one, but of many,

"...the

reality of the world is guaranteed by the presence
of
others

.

"

[

13

]

B

Arendt

s

•

The Requirements of Action

characterization of action emanates from her

admiration and understanding of the Greek polis.
Arendt

s

view,

In

the polis provided a space where individuals

could disclose their unique identities through speech and
deeds,

and strive for immortal fame.

While the polis was

a

forum for the contest of words and works, it also provided

a

mechanism for their remembrance, thereby enabling them to
become truly immortal.

Arendt asserts that the poet Homer

and the historian Thucydides did not achieve the task of

immortalization themselves, but rather the polis itself,
"seemed to assure that the most futile of human activities,
action and speech, and the least tangible and most ephemeral
of man-made

'products,'

the deeds and stories which are

their outcome, would become imperishable
as it sounds the polis,

."[ 14

]

As abstract

an organization of human beings,

ensures that the space of appearances will not only secure
future possibilities for action, but the means for their

remembrance as well.

organized remembrance

The polis, says Arendt, "is
."[ 15

]

a

kind of

For Arendt, politics emerges

directly from

acting and speaking in the public realm.

Action becomes

a

constitutive element of this realm which

rendered authentic in
seeing and being seen.

a

is

plurality, which is the mutuality of
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What, then are the attributes and requirements
of

action?

Action takes place between individuals in the

public realm who are characterized by their equality and

distinction.

Speech and action are revelatory and disclose

who individuals are in all their unique specificity, while
also signaling a new beginning.

Arendt says, "This

revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore
where people are with others and neither for nor against
them -- that is,

in sheer human togetherness ."[ 16

Arendt, the actor is an agent,
than a "what"

a

]

For

disclosing "who" rather

(an assemblage of personality traits and

characteristics), and seeks to reveal his identity in deed
and word.

Arendt says, "Action without

attached to it, is meaningless ..."[ 17

]

a name,

a

'who'

The actor possesses

an extraordinary amount of courage because the outcome of

action, by its very nature,

is uncertain and unpredictable.

Because of its inherent unpredictability, action could just
as likely produce a bad regime as a good one.

The prospects

for a good regime depend on an honorable "founding" and

a

commitment on the part of all to secure the conditions for
the future possibilities of action.

For Arendt,

action involves striving for the

immortality and permanence of words, deeds, and stories.
Her action is agonistic and individualistic, reminiscent of
the politics found in the Athenian polis.

Like the kind of

politics that flourished briefly, but spectacularly in the
polis, Arendt

'

s

political action is constituted by words and
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deeds which are immortalized through stories
and

remembrance.

The "story" of action is preserved and

"reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that
is, to
the backward glance of the historian, who indeed
always

knows better what it was all about than the
ic ipant s

.

"

[

18

]

Actors act in the presence of their

peers and strive to distinguish themselves from each other
in their excellent words and deeds.

George Kateb asserts

that for Arendt,

The aim of politics is to perpetuate itself,
to immortalize itself -- not only in the sense
that individuals aspire to say and do imperishable
things, but in the enfolding sense that all who
act act for the sake of preserving future possibilities for action. The common interest is the
preservation of the frame of action, a
constitution. [19]

Thus for Arendt, politics is the quintessential worldly and

immortalizing act.

The decision to act in the world

creates the potential space for freedom and the

possibilities for future actions.
To act politically is to take an initiative and to

begin something that might be larger than oneself.

Violence," an essay in Crises Of The Republic

,

In "On

Arendt

asserts that human beings are political beings by virtue of

action which also makes them more fully human.

describing action she says.

In
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to act is the human answer to the condition
of natality.
Since we all come into the world
by virtue of birth, as newcomers and beginnings,
we are able to start something new; without the'
fact of birth we would not even know what novelty
is, all 'action' would be either mere behavior
or preservation .[ 20
.

.

.

Natality is the underlying force of the initiative or
impetus in action; each newcomer and each individual

possesses the capacity to begin something new, original, and
unprecedented.

Arendt characterizes natality as

a

miracle

of faith and hope in its spontaneous beginnings and it is,

she says,

the condition in which "action is ontologically

rooted. "[21]

Natality can be seen as the one constant and

continuous element in an otherwise uncertain world of human
affairs.
action.

It is the source of new life,

Arendt

'

s

and hence, of

elaboration on natality expresses her

faith in the world of human appearances, in the public realm
-- in its health and growth through action.

The capacity to

establish the world anew and the spark of novelty, closely
relates to the sentiment Arendt mentions frequently to

demonstrate her feeling of responsibility for the world.
Amor mundi, or love of the world, refers to the feeling of

being at home in the world and belonging to

it.

For Arendt,

care for the world is of inestimable importance, and

anything less becomes a repudiation of the human condition
itself

Speech and action allow the revelation of individuals'
unique distinctness; they confirm the variousness of human
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beings.

Arendt contends that human life without
speech and
action, and when it is not lived among others,
ceases
to

exist.

in the public realm,

are revealed to one another,

identities.

individuals' words and deeds

thusly they disclose their

in this context,

individuals create

stories of action that can be recorded for remembrance and
for future actors.

It is important to understand that for

Arendt, language itself constitutes action because it

distinguishes human beings from the rest of animal life.
In addition to speech, unexpectedness and boundlessness

are also distinctive features of action.

Arendt asserts

that spontaneity "is inherent in all beginnings and in all

origins ."[ 22

]

no limitations,

Action is boundless in the sense that it has
impacting on all individuals who are capable

of initiating their own actions.

This "reaction" to action

is actually the instigation of a new action;

thus,

begets other newly instigated actions to establish

constant circulation.

action
a

There are also elements of

unpredictability and irreversibility in action; it cannot be
foretold or undone.

Action, then, is open-ended and "fixed"

at the same time.

Arendt introduces two concepts to counter the

potentially damaging effects of action's irreversibility and
unpredictability.

She proposes the faculties of forgiving

to rescue action from the dilemma of irreversibility,

promising, as a remedy for unpredictability.

forgiving entails

".

.

and

Where

.being able to undo what one has done
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though one did not, and could not, have known
what he was
doing...," promising, is a remedy for the
"chaotic

uncertainty of the future ..."[ 23

]

Both faculties correspond

inherently to action insofar as they require the condition
of plurality because

.no one can forgive himself and no one can feel bound
by a promise made only to himself; forgiving and
promising enacted in solitude or isolation remain
without reality... no more than a role played before
one s self [24
.

.

'

.

]

Arendt views these faculties as safeguards against the
excesses of action and believes that without them, human

beings have little to rely on and little recourse.

But,

she

says, not knowing future outcomes and being unable to

control events is the price paid for freedom, plurality, and

reality itself.

While Arendt acknowledges the potential dangers
inherent in action and plurality, she sings its praises as
the key to sustaining political life:

The calamities of action all arise from the
human condition of plurality, which is the
condition sine qua non for that space of
appearance which is the public realm. Hence
the attempt to do away with this plurality is always
tantamount to the abolition of the public realm
itself 25
.

[

]

It is clear that the uncertainty of action is not Arendt

main concern, but the elimination of plurality and the
public space which joins people is.

The reality of the

'

30

world is underscored by the plurality of the
public space.
This worldly space also requires interstices between
people
which separate them from each other, and without which,
no

human life -- no political life -- is possible.

For Arendt,

this "in-between" space prevents the tendency toward
fo

it

and tne creation of mass society, while also

preserving the uniqueness and diversity of individuals.
1

.

The Conundrum and Ambiguity of Action

Arendt

'

s

theory of action has provoked varied responses

among her readers and critics.

Bernstein, Tlaba, and Parekh

find her theory overly abstract and abstruse, her standards
of greatness troublesome,

and her sharp division between the

political and the social both unreflective of, and

inappropriate to contemporary political realities.

These

critics find her political categories rigid, but at the same
time,

strangely arbitrary; her concepts superficially

attractive in their open-endedness, yet flat in terms of her
failure to elaborate on the internal connections within
them.

Arendt

’

phenomenological approach to her political

s

catalogue is a novel, yet idiosyncratic one, and many are

quick to point out that ambiguities abound in her thought.
It is plausible to advance the notion that ambiguity is

embedded in her theory.

Bhikhu Parekh puts it succinctly

when he says, "Action is one of the most important

categories in Arendt's political philosophy, yet the least

clearly def ined.

"

[

26
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Her concept of action is nebulous; her quest for the

political is elusive.

For example, George Kateb finds a

certain vagueness with regard to Arendt's thoughts on the
content of political action, asserting that she defies the

specificity that most readers want to impose on her.

To

illustrate this and the extent to which ambiguity is

embedded within Arendt's concept of action, Kateb draws an
analogy between competitive games and political action:
"...a game can be completely intelligible

action can never be

—

—

as

political

and totally free of human nature,

free of motives, hidden or obvious, while political action

must fight free of human nature. "[27]

In other words, the

rules of a game are (usually) known to all who play, but

action is its own end representing infinite and transcendent

possibilities.

But Kateb

'

s

main concern with Arendt's

action is that it appears to be separated from moral

motivation; it does not exist to be morally just or
correct. [28]

Political action, then, is not about justice:

"The supreme achievement of political action is existential,

and the stakes are seemingly higher than the moral
ones. "[29]

To counter such concerns and the risks inherent

in action, Arendt offers the faculties of forgiving and

promising, moral precepts which emerge directly from the

will to act.

This does not satisfy Kateb however, who

claims that her version of keeping promises overlooks the

nature and content of the commitments made.

Additionally,

he claims that her standard of forgiveness fails to

understand that

group is not responsible for forgiving,

a

only the person to whom wrong was done can forgive the
wrongdoer.

Kateb believes that Arendt's built-in remedies

are inadequate and in referring to the Eichmann case states,

Promise-keeping cannot form a barrier to atrocity.
Eichmann kept faith with his leader. Who can forgive
what he and his superiors did? Arendt herself
cannot... she says so powerfully at the end of Eichmann
in Jerusalem [30
.

]

As if to oppose herself and to agree with Kateb, Arendt

addresses this by responding that acts of ’’radical evil”

cannot be punished or forgiven because they occur outside
the realm of human affairs and potentialities, which they

tend to crush.

Unfortunately, her responses to this dilemma

are insufficient to the criticisms and remain undeveloped.
If acts of radical evil cannot be punished or forgiven

because they are so antithetical to action, how are they
handled?

There seems to be no satisfactory response to deal

with misguided, twisted action.

Richard Bernstein's comments illustrate further the
ambiguity that is part and parcel of Arendtian political
action.

theory as

He asserts that if we are seeking to use Arendt's
a

guide to predict the future, we best look

elsewhere because it is not in the nature of political
action to offer guideposts for behavior.

Bernstein writes:
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—

We are never in a position
before the fact -to know whether the virtues of political
action
or its terrible vices will be manifested.
This
systematic ambiguity lies at the very core of
Hannah Arendt's metaphysics of action; it is
rooted, so to speak, in the ontology of action
...In speaking of the systematic ambiguity of
action, I am singling out what is an attribute,
the most essential attribute
of action itself'.
There is no way of eradicating or diminishing the
ambiguity of action without eliminating action

—

itself

.

[

31

This statement,

]

I

think, captures quite well a central

problematic in Arendt's theory.

it appears that what Arendt

prizes most about action is its elusive, unknown quality

which may lead to

a

restoration of what she regards as

authentic political life.
2

.

Action's Antithesis: Behaviorism and Mass Society
That action is not

a

guide to predict the future is

central idea in Arendt's thought.

a

Within her critique of

social science is the contention that action has become

behavior and that individuals have lost their ability to
think independently and act freely.

The consequence of

action becoming behavior is that the social scientist
studies human actions in terms of regularities and behavior.

This distortion is decried by Arendt who sees the content of
action as free and unpredictable.

The growth of mass

society has contributed even further to the distortion and

impossibility of action.

In stark contrast to behavior,

action is a concept that is inherently ambiguous and openended.

Not even the actor knows the outcome of the action
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initiated, and therefore, is not bound by the
determinism of
history or nature. Arendt writes:
The pe rp lexity is that in any series of events
that together form a story with a unique
meaning we can at best isolate the agent who
set the whole process in motion; and although
this agent frequently remains the subject, the
'hero' of the story, we never can point unequivocally to him as the author of its eventual

outcome

.

[

32

Thus while Arendt's action remains free from determinism,

inevitable laws of nature, and behaviorism, it is,
nevertheless, extremely elusive and questionable.

On the

face of it, claims about the absence of morality and moral

outcomes in Arendt's political action seem justifiable.

But

how can Arendt be concerned with outcomes and responsibility
when she maintains that action is its own end, that it is
not a means, and that it remains unpredictable?

Given her

steadfast adherence to the spontaneity and open-endedness of
action, there does not appear to be a reconciliation on the

horizon
While she paints a portrait of a world busily talking
politics, in which there appears to be

a

lack of concern for

morality it is, perhaps, in her attention to the world and
its care,

or amor mundi, that her sensitivity to morality

and responsibility emerge.

Amor mundi means literally,

"love of the world" and implies the joining of self with

others in a commitment to a public way of life.

Elisabeth

Young-Bruehl notes that while working on The Life of the
Mind, Arendt felt that the mental capacities of thinking,
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willing,

and judging also contributed to this sense
of

caiing for the world.

Young-Bruehl asserts that, "What

united her thought was the love she had come to
understand
as the one that unites self and others

—

Amor Mundi."[33]

Thus, responsibility toward the world involves not only

political action in the space of appearances, but the life
of the mind and the "silent dialogue between me and

myself. "[34]

In contrast to speech, which occurs between

persons in the public space, this dialogue constitutes the
sheer activity of thinking within the individual.

individual thinks independently in

a

The

conversation with the

self which contributes to the exercise of political action.

The self-thinking in this dialogue is an important element
in Arendt's schema.

A certain amount of self-thinking must

go on before an actor appears in the public space.

We find even further support for the inherent ambiguity
in Arendt's theory of action in her critiques of behaviorism

and mass society.

Noting the "uniqueness and responsibility

of the individual human person" as a central theme in

Arendt's work, Dante Germino believes that it corresponds

compellingly to her critique of behaviorism and

behaviorialist social science.[35]

Arendt rejects the quest

for uniformities in human nature and the "rule" of society

which, she says,

affecting
members

a

." [36

"excludes the possibility of action by

kind of enforced behavior or conformism from its
]

According to Arendt, the possibility for

spontaneity does not exist in mass society.
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For Arendt

mass society is

,

a

monolith that results in

the "substitution of behavior for action ."[
37

]

of the

social sciences, which have become "behavioral sciences,"

Arendt says they "aim to reduce man as a whole, in all his
activities, to the level of
animal

[38

]

a

conditioned and behaving

Arendt finds that "society constitutes the

organization of the life process" and that it is

a

form in

which "the activities connected with sheer survival are

permitted to appear in public. "[39]

For Arendt, the animal

laborans is tied to the life process which maintains species
survival and, therefore, should not be elevated to the

public realm to be equated with the glories of political
action.
is

She maintains vigorously that "whether an activity

performed in private or in public is by no means

of indif f erence

.

"

[

40

a

matter

Arendt claims that the invasion of

]

the social into the public realm drives individual

differences and particularity into the private sphere
instead of the public sphere, where they publicly reveal and

validate the unique identity of the individual.

Mass

society precludes any possibility for action to take place
and "demands that its members act as though they were

members of one enormous family which has only one opinion
and one interest ."[ 41

]

This point is similar to her

criticism of Plato's extension of the private character of
the household into the public sphere.

Arendt juxtaposes the spontaneity of action and its
inherent ambiguity against the regularity and repetition of

37

science and the scientific method.

m

its search for

patterns of regularity, science and social science
reduce
living phenomena to data and behavior. Germino
asserts that

Adolph Eichmann is Arendt's example of the condition
she
finds abhorrent.

Eichmann knew how to "behave" efficiently

but could not act or think for himself.
Gabriel Tlaba finds Arendt's distinction between action
and behavior troubling because he thinks that even

repetitive and routinized activities "involve some
initiative and judgment ."[ 42

]

He believes that Arendt would

be hard-pressed to find a society without behavior.

Arendt's analysis fails to offer a plausible response to
Tlaba'

s

charge.

Arendt's point is that contemporary society

elicits behaviorial and conditioned types of responses from

people who no longer think and act for themselves.

She

fails to consider that routinized tasks have the potential
for action,

and in so doing, limits the scope of action even

as she attempts to prove how expansive it is.
a.

Freedom or Necessity in the Public Space ?

Bernstein

points out that Arendt's clear identification of freedom and

action ("to be free and to act are the same") establishes an
important linkage from which other issues emanate. [43]

Against the background of freedom and action, emerges the
crucial distinction between freedom and necessity upon which

her political
rest.

v.

social,

As stated earlier,

and public v. private distinctions
for Arendt,

action can only occur

outside the realm of necessity which is tied to the
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household and the chore of keeping oneself alive.

Bernstein

illustrates how significant this point is for her:
From Arendt's perspective the confusion of the
realm of necessity with that of freedom, or the
belief that somehow freedom emerges out of
or
merges with -- necessity has been one of the
most serious and disasterous confusions in modern
history
especially since the French Revolution .[ 44

—

—

For the individual, freedom constitutes breaking out of the

repetition of necessity.

This can only be accomplished

through action in the public realm and appearing to others.
Of the public realm Tlaba says,

"For Arendt, only

participation of the self, the revelation of one's thoughts
through action and speech in concert with others, is what

constitutes the public realm. "[45]

Arendt faults the French, and to

a

lesser extent

perhaps, the Russian revolutionaries for attempting to

alleviate poverty and other social ills, thereby tainting
the public realm with household and private concerns.

"politics of compassion" is not

a

The

politics for Arendt; it is

inappropriate to address social welfare concerns in the
realm that is reserved for action and authentic politics.

Regarding the failure of the French Revolution, Arendt
states in no uncertain terms that necessity tainted the

public realm, "It was necessity, the urgent needs of the
people, that unleashed the terror and sent the Revolution to
its doom. "[46]

The "politics of compassion" took over,

and poverty became a political phenomenon addressed in the

public realm.

This is in contrast to the American
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Revolution which established
a

a

real foundation for freedom,

separation of powers, and lasting institutions.

Further

contrasting the American Revolution to the French, Arendt
claims
The direction of the French Revolution was deflected almost from its beginning ... through the
immediacy of suffering; it was determined by
the exigencies of liberation not from tyranny
but from necessity, and it was actuated by the
limitless immensity of both the people's misery
and the pity this misery inspired. [47

Arendt argues that the French Revolution was governed by

historical necessity, ideology, and terror, while the

American Revolution culminated in

a

conscious act of

founding that established public freedom and

spontaneous action.

a

space for

For Arendt, revolution is not a

liberation from necessity, but rather an opportunity to
found

a

permanent space for freedom with lasting

institutions --

a

constitution,

a

government organized by

separation of powers, laws, and rights.
the French revolutionaries,

fact that poverty became

by

a

a

a

The fatal flaw of

according to Arendt, was the

political phenomenon, motivated

drive to liberate people from necessity.

Arendt is

unyielding in her belief that the satisfaction of individual
or private needs,

and the redress of social ills, do not

automatically occasion the achievement of freedom.
does the act of founding necessarily yield freedom.

founding can lead to

a

good or

a

But nor
A

bad regime; it is up to the
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founders how to proceed in establishing lasting
institutions
that will create freedom.

Bernstein, troubled about Arendt's division of the
social and the political, is quick to point out that

Even when we take Arendt’s warnings with full
ssriousnes s the fact remains that our problematic
is one in which the social and the political are
inextricably connected. .We can agree with Arendt
that social liberation does not automatically lead
to political freedom and that the belief that it
does can be disasterous in both theory and practice.
But we cannot avoid the consequence that political
f reedom
can no longer be achieved for us without
an attempt to solve the serious social issues that
confront us [48
,

.

.

.

.

.

However, Arendt does not deny that pressing social questions
exist;

rather,

she feels that they are best worked out in a

more technical and administrative sphere through agencies

equipped to find solutions to those kinds of problems.

Arendt's fears about the encroachment of social problems on
political life emanate from her understanding of
totalitarianism, and the absolute inability of action to
occur within an automatically functioning mass society.

Bernstein observes that Arendt understood
.how fragile and limited the realm of politics
really is and the dangers that result when this
realm of freedom and political action is confused
with the pressing needs and demands of social life. [49]
.

.

Arendt maintains that certain things are appropriate for the
public realm, while others must remain within the private
realm.

People acting, speaking, and persuading appear
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publicly, while goodness, bodily needs, and labor
should be
hidden.
Arendt believes that each human activity, public
or
private, has its "proper location in the world" without

which it would cease to exist. [50]

The emphasis on "proper

location," "space," "appearance," and "worldliness" all

underscore Arendt'
political theory.

adherence to spatial dimensions in her

s

Space, not time,

her vision of political life.

is the key element in

she is concerned with the

enduring issues, the timeless currents, which make for
lasting public world,

a

she leaves questions of social and

human needs to technocrats and planners, whose attempts to
improve conditions, when they cross-over into the public
realm, undermine it.
In a roundtable discussion in 1972 Arendt was dogged

repeatedly with questions from her colleagues and critics
about her radical distinction between the social and the

political.

In the discussion Bernstein insists that "...one

can't consistently make that distinction ... It

'

a

question

of whether you can dissociate or separate the social and the

political consistently now. "[51]
comment is worth quoting in full:

Arendt 's response to the

There are things where the right measures can
be figured out.
These things can really be administered and are not then subject to public debate.
Public debate can only deal with things
which
if we want to put it negatively
we
cannot figure out with certainty.
if we can figure
it out with certainty, why do we all need to get
together? ... everything which can really be figured
out, in the sphere Engels called the administration of things — - these are social things in general.
That they should then be subject to debate
seems to me phony and a plague. [52]
•

—

—

.

.

Arendt is adamant on this point; she does not hold out any
hope that speeches, debates, hearings, and committee

discussions will find solutions to the very serious social
problems that confront us today.

Her support for a

technical and administrative approach to these problems is
ironic because of her disdainful attitude toward any

approach that is an inherent feature of mass society,

in

this rather contentious roundtable, her colleagues and

critics refused to let up; C.B. Macpherson and Albrecht

Wellmer pressed on questioning whether juries and town
meetings were reserved exclusively for "political" matters,

while the rest of supposedly public matters were social in
scope, and therefore required no extended debate.

Weren't

social problems "unavoidably political problems ...?"[ 53

Arendt responded that social questions have

a

double face;

for example, there is no question that everyone should have

decent housing, but whether the goal of decent housing

should be achieved through integration is debatable and
therefore,

a

political question.

Essentially, she believes
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in the universal human right of everyone to have
safe

housing,

food,

clothes, and rights guaranteed by law, but

the means by wh ich these goals should be achieved are not

the stuff of her politics.

Thus, Arendt thoroughly upholds

her distinction and does not delve deeper into the real

subtleties of the relationship between the issues she deems
social, and the content she regards as political.

Her

conceptual framework does not allow her to see the

difficulties of her restrictive, and seemingly arbitrary

distinctions and categories.

Determining what is political for Arendt, and thus

a

subject worthy of public debate, seems to me the most

difficult question.

What is social by Arendt's standards

and therefore ineligible to become a matter for public
debate,

contemporarily speaking, the standard "fare" of

is,

politics.

Urban poverty, under-employment, black infant

mortality, AIDS, crack; these are commonly interpreted as

political issues that require political solutions.

Such

questions are often addressed by political action, through

government assistance programs, and citizen group
involvement.

But according to Arendt's schema, these

responses are symptoms of the problems with contemporary

political life.
In his analysis, Bhikhu Parekh stresses the importance
of Arendt's emphasis on distinguishing political life from

the natural and animal world,

the animal laborans.

and the political actor from

Parekh asserts that Arendt believed
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that the Western tradition of philosophy was
ill-equipped to

confront politics because it addressed itself to nature's
order and the universe, not human life.

Parekh notes that Arendt elaborates a kind of typology
in which human beings are set apart from the natural world

by their potential to begin something new, and by their
capacity for freedom and transcendence .[ 54

]

Human life, in

contrast to animal life, possesses the capacity to break the

recurring monotony of the natural cycle to begin new things.
Arendt'

s

typology originates with human life being

indistinguishable from natural and animal life, which is the
condition of the animal laborans, or the laborer.

The

ability to master his animal nature and to fashion

a

human

world through work, takes the individual one step closer to
becoming an actor.

Action manifests itself at the moment

when the individual transcends nature and begins something
new.

For Arendt, the objective is to actualize what

individuals are given at birth to the fullest, and to break
away from the entrapment and monotony of the life process.

Action is the crowning moment of an individual's life when
the promise inherent in natality is realized.

But in the

final analysis, Parekh is highly critical of Arendt'

s

tri-

partite division of labor, work, and action because they "do
not exhaust the vita activa...for many activities, such as

making love, humanitarian work, and religion, fall outside
them. "[55]

In addition, he finds it troubling that Arendt

fails to address the distinctions and subtleties within each
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of the three activities of the human
condition and their

relations to one another.

earning

For example, Parekh notes that

living has as much to do with sustaining
life as
laboring does.
Similarly, there are different ways within
laboring of making a living. The three categories
are not
a

mutually exclusive, i.e., an artist participates in all
three. [56]
of action,

others,
b

-

And while plurality is an underlying attribute
the concepts of labor and work occur among

in a plurality.

Where's the Action ?

Parekh argues that Arendt

'

s

Like Bernstein and Tlaba,

theory of political action is

not only unclear, but it is not apparent what actually
exists in her political community besides alot of debate and

discussion.

He also claims that Arendt advances two

different conceptions of politics, an agonistic view in her

earlier thought, and a more participatory one concerned with
public freedom and happiness in her later work,

of these

strains Parekh says, "she capitalized on ambiguity and

ascribed to participatory politics

a

attributable only to agonal politics
that Arendt'

s

degree of importance
." [57

]

Parekh argues

standard of greatness leads her to overinflate

the glory of participatory politics because she judges it in

terms of agonal politics.

Not only is the Greek style

uncommon in today's world, but the participatory politics of
the councils hardly deserve the high praise she lavishes on

them
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Parekh'

s

analysis also faults Arendt for excluding

economic and moral questions from her politics and
for an
apparent lack of conflict between principles. Essentially,
he and other critics question where the issues, opinions,

and disagreements are in Arendt

’

s

politics.

What does an

Arendtian politics boil down to but great words and deeds
preserved for posterity by historians and storytellers?
There is little conflict over the words and deeds despite
Arendt’

s

emphasis on individuals coming together in all

their uniqueness, specificity, and difference.

Parekh

remarks ironically that the politics she envisions is

unlikely to happen in the world she describes: "Political
discussion here is almost like

a

leisurely academic seminar.

Plato abolished politics; Arendt comes too close to doing
so. "[58]

This telling insight suggests that Arendt’s

political community might be construed as utopian or
cultural and aesthetic, but certainly not lively in the way
that her descriptions would have us believe.

It is as if

politics were sanitized or non-existent

Her concept of

.[

59

]

rulership may, in fact, contribute to this problem.
envisions

a

relationship of equals fueled by

a

Arendt

shared

commitment to a political way of life, which involves
placing the public world and good above narrowly defined
self, or group interest.

Essentially, she favors

government where there are no rulers and where

a

a

cooperative

partnership between government and citizens exists.

Most

critics like Parekh, chide Arendt for her failure to account

for economic,

social,

and class elements that contribute to

the content of contemporary politics.

They quite rightly

assert that Arendt's politics reflects little of
the content
and style of today's politics.
In short,

critics charge Arendt with oversimplification

and essentialism with regard to her politically defined
concepts.

Arendt's phenomenological descriptions,

delineations, and recovery of politics result in

a

somewhat

narrow and restrictive sense of the potential possibilities
for action.

As she describes the characteristics of action,

she flattens them in her neglect of the relations and

internal connections between phenomena.
For Arendt, real revolution is not the alleviation of

misery or poverty through
programs, but

a

a

series of social and economic

conscious act of establishing principles

that preserve and protect a space for politics.

A

revolution is, quite literally, the constitution of
political life with citizens contributing to its ability not
only to survive, but to flourish.

Revolution can lead to

the establishment of authentic political life where people

join together to create conditions for freedom in their

Breaking with the past by means of liberation,

daily lives.

revolution, and founding are the steps which lead toward the

creation of a space for freedom, the goal of
Arendt's political community is

face-to-face quality.
take root in

a

a

a

revolution.

small one with

a

kind of

Her vision of politics is unlikely to

large society since its size, scale, and
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odbotance are drawn from life in the Greek polis.
the ambiguity,

is the impracticality of her politics for
a

bureaucratic, and industrialized society.

-‘-^•‘-5®/

c

Added to

-

The Arendtian Political Self

-ons^ience

,

Evil

,

in Hannah Arendt

.

-

George Kateb illuminates three

characteristics that belong to the Arendtian political
actor.

First, he claims that her political actor reveals

strengths such as courage, Machiavellian virtuosity,
judgment, and eloquence.

Second, the actor is a masked

persona, an identifiable character, who like

a

performer

creating a role, hides himself in order to reveal more.
Third, the persona allows the actor to escape the self and
for Arendt,

freedom from the self is one of the most

important indications of worldliness

.[

60

]

She maintains

that the self can only be known through appearing to others,
not through introspective self-perception which does not

become part of reality in the space of appearances.

To live

outside oneself is to live for acting and being in the
world.

It takes courage to leave the private realm, but

appearing in the world is, for Arendt,

a

main guarantee of

its reality and our shared humanity.

Arendt regards the unmasking of the self as dangerous

because it destroys the distance and the worldly space

between people which are crucial in sustaining
community.

a

political

An unmasked persona is an unprotected self, and

this self disintegrates into

a

self -consuming passion.

The

emotions compassion and love undermine the masks which are
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necessary conventions in the political arena Arendt
envisions.

These masks keep the non-authentic self from

appearing in the public realm where according to Arendt,
it
does not belong
She maintains that we can only know
.

ourselves through others, and that the pursuit of selfish
and personal motives, goals, and ends doom us to an

unworldly, anti-political, and introspective fate.

Arendt maintains that love is fundamentally antipolitical and unworldly.

Though it is

a

disclosing

activity, love, like introspection, "by reason of its

passion, destroys the in-between which relates us to and

separates us from others. "[61]

The only in-between, or

mediation that exists between lovers is the child, who is

a

reminder of worldliness and a sign of natality and beginning
anew.

Arendt says further,
Love, by its very nature,
is for this reason rather
it is not only apolitical
perhaps the most powerful
human forces. [62]

is unworldly, and it
than its rarity that

but antipolitical,
of all antipolitical

Arendt substitutes respect for love as the proper mode of
human relations in the political community because it is

without intimacy or closeness and is mindful of the need for

worldly distance.

Love also remains outside politics

because, as Ronald Beiner remarks, "it impairs judgment,"

which requires mediation and distance

.[

63

Arendt 's categorization of love as anti-political
contributes to her desire to maintain the public/private
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distinction which has ramifications for the potential
of
women's participation in the public realm. While amor

mundi

is

love that sustains the public sphere, Arendt believes

that romantic and other kinds of love die if displayed
in
public.

These kinds of love can only survive in the private

realm of the family or the mind.

Thus, Arendt distinguishes

between amor mundi (worldly love), and romantic (private
love), which if used politically, becomes distorted.

An

example of love's distortion is the French Revolution; the

revolutionaries’ compassion and attempt to alleviate

suffering became

a

perversion of love.

For Arendt, this

manifestation of love in the public realm is unfit.
Arendt

'

s

As

actors are male, and express their love as amor

mundi, women, who she barely mentions except for pariah

women, remain in the private sphere where love is intimacy.

Because this love never appears in public, the potential for

women to gain access to the public realm is extremely
limited in Arendt 's theory.

The political action Arendt

envisions takes place within the public sphere, and not in
the private realm which,

for her,

is not only apolitical,

but anti-political.

While Arendt is criticized for her model of action, for
elevating ordinary participatory politics to great heights,
she herself notes that the reason for Athenian glory, short-

lived as it was,

"was precisely that from beginning to end,

its foremost aim was to make the extraordinary an ordinary

occurence of everyday life. "[64]

Critics have commented on
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Arendt’s fondness for endowing political
activity with
greatness.
They believe that her standards of
greatness in
politics are too high, her vision of what
politics "should
be" too grandiose.
Arendt speaks, I think, directly

to this

criticism, standing by her belief in the
sanctity and
miraculous qualities of action.
she says,

...action can be judged only by the criterion of
greatness because it is in its nature to break
through the commonly accepted and reach into the
extraordinary, where whatever is true in common
and everyday life no longer applies because everything that exists is unique and sui generis...
Thucydides, or Pericles, knew full well that* he
had broken with the normal standards for everyday
behavior when he found the glory of Athens ...[ 65
]

Arendt believes that the political community inspires
individuals to achieve extraordinary things and to perform
great deeds.

Even in her shift from agonal, immortalizing

politics to the participatory politics of the American
Founders, she clings to the mantle of greatness as a

significant element of action.

Arendt saw the council system as a viable space for
action, one that would fill the void left by the Athenian

polis.

In On Revolution

,

Arendt focuses primarily on how

the revolutionary spirit embodied in the American revolution

can be preserved and channeled into establishing permanent

spaces and institutions for action.

Arendt believes that

commitment to the growth of democratic institutions and

principles fosters public freedom and happiness, thereby
increasing the prospects for genuine political action.

a
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o£ Action: Agonal and
Participatory

.

m

order to examine and scrutinize the
content of Arendt's
politics, it is necessary to look at what
she believes
creates the conditions for action; that
is, what is
political action's context. Arendt's examples
of specific
actors are sparse, for instance she mentions
Achilles,
Homer, Pericles,

and Jesus, the last of whom she says

discovered the human capacity to act. [66]

The Periclean

funeral oration serves as an agonal model of a
courageous
act.

Arendt's idea of courage suggests that happiness

requires freedom, and freedom requires taking risks,
being
courageous.

she speaks more about human actors generally,

rather than of specific individuals.

Arendt's conception of

actors hinges on an opposition between the agonal style of
the Greeks and the participatory view of the American

Founders

While Achilles and the Greeks exhibit the agonal
spirit, John Jay, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson represent
the participatory view for Arendt.

characterized by

a

The agonal actor is

consuming drive to excel and to attain

greatness through courageous acts in which the risk of death
is often an element.

This is in stark contrast to the

American political ethos which Arendt so highly regards.
The play of different opinions, persuasion, compromise, and

legislation, the last of which the Greeks considered to be

pre-political, are the standard fare of the participatory

politics Arendt praises in On Revolution.

However, despite
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the divergence in her perspectives,
her concepts of freedom
and worldliness remain a common element
in both.
Founding,
speaking, acting, and constitution-making
lay the groundwork

for freedom.

Arendt would agree emphatically with Kateb's

assessment of her idea of freedom, "Freedom exists
only when
citizens engage in political action. "[67]
On Revolution is the source of Arendt'

s

ideas about

action from a participatory political standpoint.
distilled, Arendt

'

s

Simply

political action is political speech.

Arendt states:
Political action is therefore direct participation in the conversation of diverse equals,
or more rarely, in written composition for the
occasion.
The typical result is a conclusion:
a decision, a choice, a judgment, a rule. [68]
The model for Arendtian, participatory style action is her

understanding of the council system.

Arendt perceives the

councils arising spontaneously as organs of the people,

although they are comprised of

a

self-selecting elite who

"... politically ... are the best..." and who choose

specifically to take responsibility for public business and
happiness

.[

69

]

This notion of

a

self-chosen elite indicates

the elitist, anti-democratic strain in her participatory

view of political action.

Arendt states:

54

T
Sa
SUCh an aristocratic' form of governf?'
ment would
spell the end of general suffrage as
we understand it today, for only those
who as volunan
el smentary republic' have demonstrated that they care for more than their
private
happiness and are concerned about the state of
world would have the right to be heard in the the
conduct of the business of the republic [70
'

'

.

Thus,

Aj_

endt maintains that certain individuals are more

capable and more interested than others of placing the
public business ahead of their own private happiness.

Her

political elite, or class, consists of a small group of
people who act in the public realm and transact the public
business.

These actors, or leaders do not represent anyone

but themselves

,

which begs the question of what everyone

else is doing in such a community.

In Arendt’s schema there

are those who are excluded from the practice of politics and

who possess what she regards as an important "negative"

liberty originating from Christian times, namely "freedom
from politics

." [71

]

Thus, Arendt’s political elite takes up

the business of politics while the rest of us are "excused."

Instead of her version of political leadership, what we are
left with is

system of representation, which while she is

a

skeptical of it, is consistent with her belief in "freedom
from politics

"
.

Arendt is often appropriated by the left as
democrat because she describes

a

a

radical

political community with

democratic institutions, processes, and direct face-to-face
participation.

Her depiction of the council system and
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admiration for the Jeffersonian ward system
locks like the
practice of direct democracy. Arendt's
political world of
conversations among diverse equals who disclose
unique
identities before one another sounds at least
,

surface,

like direct democracy.

on the

However, despite such

democratic overtures and indications, her notion of
selecting elite puts her in

a

different camp.

a self-

it is,

indeed, difficult to square her respect for participatory

politics and the idea of people coming together, speaking
and acting, with the formation of a self-selecting elite

sprung from "the people,"
in itself.

a

nebulous and misleading concept

Conservatives have appropriated her thought

precisely for the elitism embedded in her notion of
political leadership.
Thus, the politics she describes sounds democratic on

some level, but is actually quite restrictive in substance

and the scope of participation and leadership.

For

instance, not everyone is a participant/actor in the

Arendtian political community.

Nor does everyone get the

opportunity to become part of the politically elite,
leadership cadre.
be acting,

It is,

in fact, unclear exactly who would

except the spontaneously arising, self-selecting

elite who are perceived as reliable guarantors of the public
realm, trustees of public freedom.

Arendt's rather limited

view of citizenship makes it difficult to imagine other
kinds of actors and action in the public realm.

She

ascribes public identity and political virtues to American
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Founders Jefferson and Adams, clearly part
of the political
elite of their time. Although she values
the diversity

and

differentiation of peoples in her political community,
her
sense of political participation is not inclusive;
her idea
of citizenship is limited.
Despite her apparent elitism, Arendt calls civil

disobedience

a

form of contemporary political action and

finds it praiseworthy.

Civil disobedience is also a form of

action that is inclusive, falling within

participatory framework.

a

genuinely

Her analysis of it is striking in

contrast to her overall portrayal of action arising
spontaneously, carried out by

a

self-selecting elite.

Arendt defines civil disobedience as concerted, pointed, and

sustained action that emerges from the shared agreement of
group.

Organized minorities who share common opinions

employ civil disobedience.
a

a

The elements of spontaneity and

self-selecting elite do not exist in her description of

civil disobedience.

This is but one of several notable

divergences in her thought on action.

Still, the aspects of

resistance, critique of current political practices, smallscale,
a

and inclusiveness give civil disobedience as action,

distinctly Arendtian feel.

For Arendt, civil disobedience

is a legitimate means of exercising action and voicing

protest to policies which organized minorities find harmful
to the body politic.

Her admiration for the Jeffersonian ward system of

elementary republics, which failed to materialize during the
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creation of the American republic, stems
from her concern
with the potential for people to corrupt
government with an
infusion of private interests.

The ward system proposed by

Jefferson sought to divide the republic into wards,
county,
and state republics, and the union of each to form
a
'gradation of authorities

giving people more of

a

.'[ 72

]

Jefferson was interested in

stake in public affairs, not merely

providing them with a vote by which they could exercise
their private capacity for citizenship.

Rather, he sought

to create spaces in which all people were members of the

body politic and could be heard.

Of Jefferson Arendt says:

"What he perceived to be the mortal danger to the republic
was that the Constitution had given all power to the

citizens, without giving them the opportunity of being

republicans and of acting as citizens

."[ 73

]

For Jefferson,

the ward system of government allowed everyone to experience

and partake in a share of public freedom and happiness.

But

Arendt 's respect for this system does not seem to extend
into her own idea of politics.

participation.

She clearly opposes full

It is perhaps her fear of mass society

supplanting the possibility for an authentic political life
that prevents her from endowing "the people" with the

potential to act.

This fear of the masses is

a

pervasive

thread running through her ideas on participation.

As

masses, they are not equipped to act, but Arendt 's analysis
of totalitarianism implies that any potentially viable

politics has to come to terms with their break-up.

Only
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when mass society is diffused, and individuals
claim their
ability to think for themselves and act with
others,

can an

Arendtian politics emerge where care for the world
is
primary.
While Arendt is fascinated with the ward system,
she
maintains her elitist bias.

She infuses the ward system

with her preference for a leadership '’class."

The elite and

democratic strains within her political community make her

position difficult to ascertain.
Arendt

s

While Parekh interprets

consideration of town meetings, worker's councils,

Juries, and constitution-making as evidence of the breadth
of her politics, he also counterposes his observation with a

critical and skeptical impression:

Arendt 's concept of action is so abstract that it
does not connect with the world.
For her, action
represents man's capacity to transcend nature and
necess ity
f or her, action is not only a supranatural
but a supernatural activity.
in action man performs
'miracles,' creates the 'extraordinary' and the 'unpredictable,' and 'reveals' himself. Action appears
from 'nowhere' and cannot be causally explained. 74
.

.

.

[

With

a

mix of different impressions such as this one, it is

no wonder that Arendt 's action perplexes and confuses so

many students of political theory.

Parekh'

s

observation

also points to an irony; he asserts that Arendt'
•so amorphous,

reality.

s

action is

it fails to connect with the world and

This is ironic since one of the linchpins of her

theory of action is rootedness in the world, the space of
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human appearances.

Indeed, Arendt may have thwarted

central idea to her theory unknowingly.

very
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CHAPTER III
ARENDT'S CONCEPT OF THE PARIAH
Who is the Pariah ?

A.

Having reconstructed Arendt

1

theory of action, its

s

ambiguity and the requirements for political
life, I turn
now to the concept of the pariah.
I will examine the pariah
to provide an understanding that illuminates
both its limits

and its possibilities.
action,

I

Examined against the background of

will pose the possibilities that exist for a

relationship between the pariah and political action.
During the course of this chapter,
Arendt
^

s

I

hope to glean from

writings in what sense she might have envisioned

ionship between the pariah and action.

writings does she make explicit whether

a

a

Nowhere in her

direct

relationship exists between the two ideas, though she often
implies that they share common characteristics;

I

want to

examine those characteristics.

Arendt

's

The Jew As Pariah

Totalitarianism

,

Rahel Varnhagen

Eichmann In Jerusalem

,

The Origins Of

,

,

Men In Dark Times

,

and

among other works, function as

touchstones which provide access to her thought on the
complex issue of Jewish identity,

modern world.

a

pariah identity, in the

Arendt 's concern for political action which

pervades all of her work is developed, in part, through her

understanding of the Jewish experience in the modern age.
Her articulation of the pariah's identity and potential

contribution to political life is colored by the interplay
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of the Greek,

Roman,

and American aspects of her thought.

She takes these inheritances seriously
and they influence
hei

thought on the pariah quite profoundly.

in addition,

her contributions to the debate over Zionism,
Israel, and
the future of secular European Jewry in the
Diaspora inform
and influence her ideas significantly.
The major tensions and conflicts that ripple through

Arendt's thought rise to the surface within the context of
her examination of the pariah.
^^

For example, there is the

icul ty of reconciling Arendt's notion of masked actors

with her plea for an unveiling of Jewish identity, revealing
it as it is.

Here, the parvenu's falsification of Jewish

identity is fruitless, because it undermines

requirement of politics Arendtian style; that
assertion and disclosure of

a

key
is,

the

a

specific human identity, in

this case, a Jewish identity.

Acting in the public realm

with what we are given by birth is Arendt's focus.

She

explores the facades donned by Jews eager to escape social

prejudice through Rahel Varnhagen, the 18th century GermanJewess whose salon was a mainstay of both the Goethe cult
and Romanticism during the time of Frederick the Great's

enlightened despotism.

Her meditation on Varnhagen'

s

life,

as well as her reflections on the attitudes of newly arrived

Jewish emigres in America, are reminders that we cannot
escape what is "given" by birth.

To try to do so

constitutes a renunciation of the human condition of life
itself.

The desperate attempt on the part of so many Jews

ss

to assimilate constitutes,

for Arendt

identity and a renunciation.
escape as

,

an escape from Jewish

Arendt denounces such an

foolish ploy that fails to confront the
Jewish

a

question in political terms.

The parvenu assimilationist

views the issue in a social light, which is to
grasp at illfated mechanisms to secure social acceptance that is
not

automatically guaranteed.

Social acceptance, believes

Arendt, does not necessarily provide rights or an

opportunity for political participation.

specifically offer the pariah

a means of

But she does not

direct access to

the public realm other than to acknowledge his dilemma as

political, and in so doing, points to his potentially

political characteristics.

Arendt

'

s

discussions of the pariah occur in the context

of her Jewish writings which precede her work on action and

are found in The Jew As Pariah

Totalitarianism

,

,

The Origins Of

and Rahel Varnhagen

.

Arendt'

concept of

s

the pariah also enters into others of her works in relation
to the public v. private and the political v.

distinctions.

Arendt'

s

social

characterization of the pariah,

a

social outcast and a Jew, depicts the plight of a marginal

individual who does not fully belong anywhere.

outcast she describes is the conscious pariah,
critical consciousness,
the rest of society.

a

The social
a

Jew with a

rebel against his own people and

S7

B

The Conscious Pariah

•

Although she does not explicitly state
whether the
pariah must
fact be a Jew, the concept, as she
elaborates
it, is bound specifically to Jewish
experience in

m

the

Diaspora through the modern era.
is

Her concept of the pariah

informed by the Jewish history of exclusion and

worldlessness

and set squarely against the background of

,

anti-semitism and totalitarianism.

Arendt views all Jews as

pariahs but distinguishes between those who she calls
conscious pariahs, who are aware of their marginal status
in Jewish society and in relation to European culture
and

who rebel against them politically, and the majority of

parvenu Jews who attempt to assimilate and who, at best, are
"accepted” only as exceptions.

she believes that the

majority of Jews sought the parvenu route as an attempt to
hide their Jewish identities and to become assimilated,

Arendt

'

s

view,

those Jews failed to cultivate

a

genuine

political consciousness, to see their lives in broader
political and legal terms.

Arendt 's biographer Elisabeth

Young-Bruehl notes,
In her terms, a Jew could be either a parvenu
or a pariah, and she made it very clear in discussions and later in her writings that she thought
only a pariah could develop a truly political consciousness, only a pariah could affirm his or her
Jewish identity and seek, politically, to provide
a place for Jews to live without compromising their
Jewish identity. .What astounded her about so many
of the Jews she worked with was their failure to
think politically, to realize the necessity for
Jewish solidarity in the European--the world-crisis [ 1
.

.

]

in
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Arendt's distinction between politically
conscious
pariahs and social climbing parvenus comes from
Bernard
Lazare the French- Jewish lawyer and Dreyfusard.
Lazare
believed that the pariah must rebel not only against
,

the

dominant society that rejects him and mandates social
uniformity, but also against the parvenu mentality.

Lazare

believed that the conscious pariah’s opposition to the
parvenu would begin to bring about
thinking about their status.

change in Jews'

a

Lazare'

s

courageous support

for Dreyfus engendered the wrath of Jews and non- Jews alike,

thus he was a rebel on two levels.

Arendt regards Lazare as

the first person to translate the problem of the pariah into

political terms:

Lazare 's idea was, therefore, that the Jews
should come out openly as the representative
of the pariah, 'since it is the duty of every
human being to resist oppression...' he wanted
him (the pariah) to feel that he was himself responsible for what society had done to him. [2]

The pariah of the pre- and post-Emancipation Diaspora lacked

such a sense of responsibility and did not feel himself to

be culpable, rather, he interpreted the fact of his

Jewishness like an accident or

a

personal misfortune, and

later, as an individual psychological attribute .[ 3

The distinction between pariah resisters and socially

malleable parvenus corresponds to Arendt's separation of the
political and the social.

According to Arendt, by narrowly

construing their problems as mere social adjustments to be
made, parvenus could not enter the political realm as
real

actors/participants because they rejected their Jewish
identities.

Their private sense of themselves as socially

prevented them from entering the public realm.

In

contrast, Arendt says that the conscious pariah resisted the

impulses of social inferiority with courage and independent
thought.

The conscious pariah understood his plight in

political, rather than social terms.

Lazare believed that

a

revolution needed to occur within Jewish life that would
constitute
the world.

change in parvenu thinking and an awareness of

a

In this way,

the pariah would become aware of

his condition and fight it, rather than continuing to

participate in, and thereby perpetuate

a system of gross

inequality.

Published in 1955, and written over
years, Arendt

'

s

a

period of twelve

collection of biographical essays Men In

Dark Times coincides with her concerns in The Jew As Pariah

.

Though not considered "traditional" political theory, these
essays pay tribute to some great individuals, non- Jews among
them, who exhibit a way of life akin to the conscious

pariah's and who serve as examples of amor mundi and
resistance.

In this work, Arendt demonstrates her interest

in broadening the concept of the conscious pariah, yet the

thrust of the "tradition" is anchored firmly in Jewish

Diasporic history.

[4]

The non-Jewish individuals she

examines in Men In Dark Times

:

Isak Dinesen, Randall

70

Jarrell,

and Karl Jaspers, among others, are
representative

"lights" in the dark times of the first half
of the 20th
century.
While respecting the facts of the human
condition,
tney also nurture the possibilities for its
development.

Arendt acknowledges the differences between them,
but weaves
a common thread between their love of humanity
and their
lack of estrangement from the world.
ihe conscious pariah who Arendt privileges possesses
a

critical consciousness,

a

capacity to resist oppression, and

to see the Jewish question in political terms.

Marginal,

both with respect to Jews and to the dominant culture, the
conscious pariah often takes unpopular and courageous
stances publicly and wrestles privately with identity.

Arendt

's

pariahs move in different worlds and experience

tensions resulting from their European and Jewish
identities, thus finding it difficult to be at home
anywhere.

They chafe against the predominantly Jewish

parvenu mentality, and are shunned at times by their own
people.

As advocates for human rights and political

resistance, their voices are often unheard and insights
unheeded.

These conscious pariahs: speakers, writers,

storytellers, and rebels are accepted neither by their own
people, nor by the European society Arendt refers to in her

writings
As stated earlier, Arendt'

s

understanding of the Jewish

experience in the Diaspora significantly informs and
influences her view of an authentic political community.
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Aiendt generalizes from the Jewish experience
of

worldlessness and exclusion to envision
the pariah might participate.

a

politics in which

Botstein remarks,

The Jews, once excluded from politics ... could
remain as they were historically (with all the
characteristics of Jewishness in the secular
European sense) and enter a new political realm...
The redefinition of politics in her mature thought
permitted Arendt to believe she could preserve the
special character of the Jew while permitting him
to leave behind his pariah status and participate
as an equal with other free citizens in a pluralistic
society. 5
[

Thus, Arendt characterizes the Jews as a pariah people

without

a

home and

a

place of belonging in the world, and

therefore, unable to have a political stake.

To join the

world, so to speak, and become responsible for it, the

pariah must fight for legitimately guaranteed political and
legal identities which are,

important identities.

for Arendt,

the two most

Any possibility for political

participation and amor mundi are not possible without these
identities.

Arendt relates that the Jews' Diaspora

experience of wandering, worldlessness, close business ties

with the state, and an overall cultural isolation all

culminated in

a

lack political awareness and responsibility

for the care of the world.
1

.

Worldlessness or Participation ?
Arendt envisions

a

political space in which Jews appear

as Jews without hiding their Jewish origins and changing

their identities.

She regarded America and Israel as two

Places for genuine political participation
and the
proliferation of secular Jewish life. Arendt
relates that
even after Emancipation in Europe,
there remained structural
barriers which prevented Jews from claiming
a stake
in the

political community.

social prejudices remained pervasive

and limiting factors in the exercise of
political, legal,
and social rights which came about very gradually
as

result of Emancipation.

a

But perhaps more importantly, these

liberties were ignored or suspended at will by governments.
However, even the small amount of social and political

relief that came as

a

result of Emancipation was not

completely taken advantage of by the Jews, many of whom

preferred to take the assimilationist route.

in post-

Emancipation Europe, after the decline of close court
relationships, Jews maintained their distance from
governments.

And Arendt maintains that reforms during

Emancipation did not automatically guarantee Jewish
political participation.

In Eastern Europe,

the Jews

remained just as downtrodden and discriminated against as
they ever were.

In the post-Emancipation Europe Arendt

speaks of, there was little Jewish political participation

with the exception of Zionist pariah politics and socialism.

Though she disagreed vehemently with the kind of state
that was eventually established, the creation of Israel

partially satisfied the political world she envisioned for
the pariah.

And although she was an ardent Zionist up until

the founding of Israel,

she eventually broke with Zionists
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over the way in which Israeli nationalism
manifested itself
in a close tie between a people and
a territory.
The
creation of Israel may have resolved the
"physical" aspect
of Jewish homelessness, but the pariah's
collective identity
remains profoundly marked in a historical sense
by a

spiritual homelessness.

a collective sense of dislocation,

displacement, and disconnection remain

identity of the Jew as pariah.

a

part of the

Homelessness remains

of the mindset and frame of reference for Jews,

a

part

and thus,

becomes an element of their collective identities.
The pariah may now have a means of political

participation and

a

place to call "home," Israel, but the

pariah Jew has used the government and the system to create
a new wave of homelessness.

Arendt's thoughts in 1944-50 on

the creation of Israel were incredibly prescient;

she

forecasted Palestinian homelessness and intense Israeli
nationalism, and was opposed to Israel becoming

Jewish culture.

monolithic

a

Her support for a bi-national Arab-Israeli

state made her an outcast in many influential Jewish circles

and caused her to formally break with Zionists.

The

creation of the new state of Israel failed to satisfy

Arendt's idea of

a

proliferation of secular European Jewish

culture, of Jews living as one among many cultures.

Thus,

while the Jews are not literally homeless in the sense of

having

a

homeland, and they are political actors, Arendt

remained opposed to the strict identification of

particular people with

a

land.

For Arendt, this

a

identification promoted

a

virulent nationalism and

conditions in which, inevitably, her vision
of politics
would fail to take root. America, rather
than Israel,

became Arendt’s prototypical political space
and community
for the pariah,

a

place where secular European emigre Jewry

would flourish and prosper.
Arendt's concern with the world and political action
underly the significance to her theory of being in and of
the world, of acting in the space of appearances.

This

concern characterizes the pariah’s dilemma; the importance
of belonging, participating,

and caring for the world

suggest that the pariah needs to find
access to politics.

a

point of entry and

Arendt's analysis suggests that the

pariah's exclusion and estrangment from the world need to be
overcome by his claiming Jewish identity.

Arendt's concern with the parvenu embracing and
asserting Jewish identity rather than evading it, stems from
her deep commitment to worldliness and political action.
For Arendt, in order to belong to the world, individuals

must act with others in the public space to reveal and
disclose their unique identities.

To experience one of the

aspects of action, the interplay of different opinions and
beliefs, individuals must appear in all their specificity
and present their particular views.

An individual brings

unique aspects of his identity to the public realm and these
are accentuated and further differentiated through political

action.

In a sense, we are made more fully human in the
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process of political action.

Yet how does the pariah's

disclosure of identity square with Kateb's
interpretation of
Arendt's masked actors expressing distinct
personas
and

playing roles?

While Arendt opposes the parvenu's

deliberate masquerading of Jewish identity, she
prefers some
form of societal convention to none in the
public
space.

For Arendt,

there are authentic and inauthentic social

conventions.

of the two, masks are authentic conventions

that preserve distance between people and difference,
which
she believes counteracts tendencies toward mass uniformity.

Therefore, she views conventions like masks, as safeguards
of difference which also protect minorities from a

potentially overbearing majority.

The masks prevent private

traits and interests from entering the public space where

they can corrupt and interfere with the exercise of

political action.

if the pariah joined the public realm,

is likely that he would assume a persona or a role,

conforming to Arendt's idea.

it

thus

But the pariah's initial

commitment remains to acknowledge and embrace his given
identity.
2

.

The Pariah's Characteristics

Humanity,

"in the form of fraternity," is one of the

characteristics of the pariah which Arendt says is commonly
found "among persecuted peoples. "[6]

But this type of

humanity is paradoxical as Arendt explains:
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This kind of humanity is the great privilege
pariah peoples; it is the advantage that the of
pariahs
of this world always and in all
circumstances can
have over others.
The privilege is dearly bought;
it is often accompanied by so radical
a loss of
world, so fearful an atrophy of all the organs the
which to respond to it... that in extreme cases, with
in
whicn pariahdom has persisted for centuries, we
can
speak of real worldlessness
And worldlessness alas
is a form of barbarism .[ 7
.

,

The warmth of the pariah's humanity evolved through
the

experience of persecution and oppression.

However, Arendt

believes that this warmth contributes to the disappearance
of the world, the "interspace” between us. [8]

when the

space and differences between people disappear, there is

little hope for the world and a diminished potential for

political action.

Expressed in the simple fact of being

alive, warmth can bring out the best in people, but comes

largely through the pariah's "privilege of being unburdened

by care for the world. "[9]

Care for the world depends upon

the maintenance of differentiation between all peoples which
is expressed in the public space,

by means of political action.

and on freedom established

Kateb maintains that,

Freedom and worldliness can serve as the terms
that stand for what Arendt prizes most.
She
regularly connects them; she sees them as dependent
on each other.
Freedom exists only when citizens
engage in political action.
Political action can
taka place only where there is worldliness--a common
commitment to the reality, beauty, and sufficiency
of the culture or way of life that sustains political
action
10
.

.

.

[

]
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Fearing the pariah's worldlessness and

identity are Arendt
these concerns,

1

s

is her

a

loss of Jewish

central preoccupations.

Related to

strenuous criticism of the parvenu's

denial of Jewish identity.

This rejection amounts to

nothing less than the substitution of things given
(physei)
for ready-made identities

(nomoi).

Her biography of Rahel

Varnhagen illustrates this point; one is born with
and certain facts of existence.
to reject the human condition,

and from oneself.

a

destiny

To reject what is given is
to alienate oneself from it

Arendt relates this idea to her own life

in a response to Gershom Scholem over the Eichmann

controversy:
I have always regarded my Jewishness as one of
the indisputable factual data of my life, and I
have never had the wish to change or disclaim
facts of this kind.
There is such a thing as a
basic gratitude for everything that is as it is;
for what has been given and was not, could not
be, made, for things that are physei and not

nomo

.

[

11

]

This basic gratitude constitutes the pariah's acceptance of
the human condition, the facts of birth and unfolding

destiny.

Arendt describes the characteristics that are "given"
in the Jewish pariah identity in the essay "We Refugees"

written in 1943, shortly after her arrival in the United
States.

heart,

'

"All vaunted Jewish qualities

—

the 'Jewish

humanity, humor, disinterested intelligence -- are

pariah qualities

[12

The pariah is distinguished by a
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capacity for speaking, thinking, and story-telling,
all of
which have sustained the Jewish people in their
wanderings
throughout the Diaspora.
The pariah engages in critical

observations of the world which spring directly from his
exclusion from it.

The pariah,

a

marginalized non-entity in

relation to the world, speaks a discourse of the heart and
mind and maintains

a

critical perspective and distance

.[

13

The pariah brings an outsider's independent perspective
to events and is free from the sway of powerful and
»

entrenched interests and biases. [14]

As an outsider,

the

pariah does not belong to conventional social groupings, and
thus is not wedded to a particular set of interests; this,
in effect,

constitutes the pariah's freedom.

Arendt argues

that the history of Jewish exclusion has given the pariah a

certain kind of freedom, though bought at
an outsider with no status.

high price, as

a

As an outsider,

the pariah

often risks taking an independent perspective which

manifests itself in unpopular positions and stances.

Unlikely to gain social acceptance in conventional society
on his own terms, these risks hardly jeopardize the pariah

who distinguishes himself from others through them.

The

pariah's unique stance contributes to the growth and respect
for difference in the Arendtian political community.

pariah's speech and thought constitute
private life y and
Arendt'

s

a

a

The

bridge between

potential entry into the political realm.

view of the pariah identity renders it potentially

useful to political action because it is

a

critical
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identity.

This,

in effect,

is

the legacy of the conscious

pariah, a critical stance engendered through
exclusion and
an acute awareness that the Jewish question
must
be

politically construed.
The German-Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz perceives
of similar pariah characteristics in the Jews.

He maintains

that the Diaspora gave Jews in particular, experiences of

"Inquiring and wandering, thinking and enduring, studying
and suf f er ing

.

"

[

15

]

The Jewish experience of suffering is,

however, different than the kind of misery and suffering
that Arendt ascribes to the French revolutionary era.

pariah's experience of suffering is

a

persecution and prejudice, rather than
poverty, deprivation, and squalor.

The

result of social
a

misery induced by

The French revolution

failed, claims Arendt, because of the people's pressing

social needs and suffering forcing their way into the public
realm.

In contrast, the pariah's suffering resides within

the collective identity of pariah people as a shared

experience, rather than becoming

a

tool used to alleviate

misery resulting from economic degradation.

Though the

pariah's moral embeddedness makes him attuned to the general

suffering of humanity because he is denied access to the
public realm, this empathy and his own suffering, pose no
threat to the political.
In contrast, Botstein claims that thinking,

feature of Arendt

'

s

a

"active politics was held to be

particularly European Jewish virtue. "[IS]

central
a

And Arendt
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maintains that Kafka's work characterized thinking
as "the
new weapon
the only one with which, in Kafka's

—

opinion,

the pariah is endowed at birth in his vital
struggle against

society ."[ 17

Kafka's depiction of thought as "an

]

instrument of self-preservation," characterizes his

understanding of the pariah according to Arendt.[18]

This

weapon is presented in contrast to the traditional pariah
responses which entail a retreat from the world into the

company of other pariahs, and the poetic withdrawal into the

beauty and awe of nature where everyone is equal.
The pariah is

a

speaker and a thinker who has the

potential to develop a critical and political consciousness
of his marginal condition.

Arendt

'

s

conscious pariah does

not experience self-alienation; his awareness constitutes
the exact opposite: an affirmation of unique identity and an

acceptance of the facts of his birth.

However, the

conscious pariah is estranged from the world such as it is.
Ironically, this estrangement and distance from the existing

society foster
conditions.

engenders

a

a

thorough-going critique of prevailing

Distance from the prevalent norms of society
critical perspective concerned with humanity and

the world at large.

Stories, satires, conversations,

and

dialogues that attempt to reconcile, and understand the

world from the outsider’s point of view emerge from the
pariah's critical distance.

But does this critical distance

allow the pariah, ever the outsider, to fully enter into and

participate in the public space as envisioned by Arendt?
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a

The central issue here is whether the
pariah can assume
public voice as an actor in order to create a
"home" in

the world and a place of belonging.

Given Arendt's stress

on being situated in the world and her insistence
on Jews

assuming

share of responsibility for its maintenance, it

a

is clear that she envisions the pariah becoming
a full and

equal participant in political life.

I

think that she sees

the pariah's participation as a significant contribution to
a

more vital and enlivened politics overall.
One place where the pariah finds acceptance and

belonging is among diverse individuals in the environment
Rahel Varnhagen sought to create in her 18th century salon.
The salons of the late 18th century spawned a pariah culture
of sorts outside conventional societal boundaries.

These

alternative public spaces encouraged dialogues among diverse
equals and offered a measure of worldliness.

Here rebels,

storytellers, poets, writers, critics, and bizarre

representatives of the intelligentsia and cultural literati,
"exiles" from both the Jewish and non-Jewish sectors of
society,
ferment.

found a rich sanctuary of cultural and intellectual
The pariahs characterized by Arendt reject the

route of assimilation and conformity and refuse

exceptionalism

,

choosing instead to affirm their particular

identities in and through their work and the salon
gatherings.

The salon corresponds to the public space that

Arendt envisions for dialogue, debate, and thinking about
politics.

It is also notable that these alternative public
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spaces were initiated mostly by women who
had no other realm
in which to experience discourse.

in what follows,

I

will

explore the lives of two women who represent
different

aspects of the pariah experience.

As conscious pariahs,

these women contributed to the growth and cultivation
of

worldliness among those traditionally regarded as outsiders.
We are now in a position to explore the pariah status

described in the preceding section through the lives of two
pariahs with whom Arendt was fascinated.

How does the

conscious pariah identity constitute itself in these two
women?

What can their lives tell us, if anything, about the

pariah's potential for political action?
as illustrations of the conscious pariah,

Using these women
I

will examine the

plausibility of an affinity between the pariah and political
action
I

chose Rahel Varnhagen and Rosa Luxemburg as two

representatives of the pariah "tradition" because they
exhibit contrasting elements of the pariah identity, are
from two different eras, and lived their lives quite

differently from each other.

Rahel exemplifies the private,

introspective strain of the pariah's intense, personal
struggle to reconcile the desire for social acceptance with
a

refusal to deny Jewish identity.

Varnhagen had few

contacts with whom she could experience the world and share
her suffering over her uncertain identity and lack of
status
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Rosa is a pariah of

different kind and temperment.

a

While Rah el struggled to gain experience and
status in the
world, Rosa, with the exception of the time
she spent in
prison, was an extremely public person with access
to the

public realm.

when she was not writing or in prison, she

spent her time in the company of her peers and party
members, speaking publicly, and generally "doing” politics.

Rosa represents an exception in that most pariahs, and most

women during the era in which she lived, remained in the
private sphere of the family without access to the public
realm

.

In what follows,

sketch briefly the lives of these

I

two pariahs.
a.

Rahel Varnhagen

.

Arendt's portrait of Rahel

Varnhagen, the late 18th and early 19th century salon
hostess, and Goethe cult organizer who was a major influence
on the Romantic Movement, was written over

period.

a

nine-year

Arendt's first published book-length work not only

illuminates the characteristics of

a

conscious pariah, but

probes the complex inner struggle through which she comes to
terms with her Jewish identity.

definition and exploration,
a

a

It is a work of self-

painfully rendered portrait of

woman laden with an unfolding identity drama, tortured by

introspection and enlightened by the salon culture she

helped stimulate.
As a young woman, Varnhagen kept her Jewishness at a

distance through introspective, self-searching which filled
a void in her life caused by society's rejection.

But over
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period of years, Varnhagen overcame her tendency
toward
self-destructive introspection as she matured through
the
experience of the salon and other events in her
a

life.

As

she experienced the world through the salon,
her struggle

with her Jewish identity assumed

a

less interior form.

Rahel had neither beauty nor wealth, and for women
of
this era in Berlin, these factors constituted

power and status.

a

measure of

With nothing to her credit but her

tendency for passionate thinking and her sensitivity toward
people, she drew a group of the most diverse and well-known

figures of Romanticism into her salon for a brief period.

Initiated during the late 18th century,

a

time of increased

and intense attempts at assimilation among German Jews,

Varnhagen'
time.

s

salon defied Prussian social conventions of the

Her salon was considered unconventional both by Jews

who were attempting to assimilate and by the rest of
society, which viewed Varnhagen'

s

gathering of major

Romantic figures with a mixture of surprise and curiosity.
The typical pariah traits of "...humanity, kindness,

freedom from prejudice, sensitiveness to injustice," all

belonged to Varnhagen, whose intense struggle over her
Jewish identity enabled her to better understand both the

pariah and parvenu aspects of her personality .[ 19
Varnhagen'

s

]

While

parvenu mentality led her to the conclusion that

she needed to escape her Jewishness in order to gain social

entry and acceptance into Prussian society, she could not
bring, herself to entirely blot out her Jewish identity by
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playing the necessary games.

While she attempted to enter

society by undertaking the role of the parvenu,
Rahel clung
stubbornly to the hope that luck, which Arendt says
is

"the

natural miracle of pariahdom," would improve her lot
in
life. [20]

Varnhagen struggled for years with her desire to

join the ranks of fashionable society and her need to

maintain her Jewish identity.

Arendt concludes that what made Varnhagen

a

conscious

pariah was her increasing awareness of the importance of

accepting tne fact of her Jewish identity.

Acceptance meant

understanding that her destiny was inextricably linked to
the human condition and the world.

Rahel explored her

pariah status by means of the salon and her various

interactions with people.

Varnhagen'

s

struggles to be

accepted by the society at large, as well as her gradual
coming to terms with the fact of her Jewish identity without

qualification make her

a

conscious pariah.

Though her

struggles assumed an interior form residing mostly in the
realm of thought, they were also expressed through

a

rich

and abundant correspondence and in the dialogues of the

salon culture which constituted her world.

Varnhagen is a rebel because she could not reconcile
herself to discarding her true identity through the

construction of a new one.

To do so would be to sacrifice

and to deny her Jewish identity and her essential nature.
Of this sacrifice, Arendt says,
a

"One had to pay for becoming

parvenu by abandoning truth, and this Rahel was not

prepared to do. "[21]

Varnhagen's rebellious spir

her

establishment of a salon "counter-culture,"
and the activity
of her thinking and speaking establish
her as the conscious
pariah Arendt privileges. Her independence
and courage
became a way of refusing to be an exception,
shunning
the

relative comforts of the parvenu and the uncertain
path of
assimilation

Established in opposition to conventional society, it
was a place Oi acceptance for those who made

conscious

a

decision, albeit one fraught with ambiguity, neither to

assimilate, nor to deny their Jewish identities.

Varnhagen's pariah world of the salon becomes
space and constitutes "world" in Arendt

’s

a

Thus,

political

terms.

The

congregation of diverse equals in conversation,
storytelling, acts of speech, recovery and remembrance with
others becomes compatible with the practice and requirements
of Arendtian action.

These elements of the salon culture

are political for Arendt and offer a means by which the

pariah can participate in the world.

Though it is an

alternative public space, the salon offers all of the

worldly elements that Arendt admires.

Principles of

mutuality and plurality manifest themselves in the
atmosphere of the salon, in which recognition of emergent
and diverse identities occurs through the give and take of
speech.

Spontaneity, unexpectedness, and the other

attributes of action are also present in the salon.
Language and dialogue constitute the link through which

a
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relationship between the pariah and
political action can be
consummated.
k*

_osa Luxemburg.

in Men In Dark Times

,

Arendt

extrapolates from J.P. Nettl's biographical
account of Rosa
Luxemburg.
Arendt' s essay illuminates Luxemburg's pariah
status both within the socialist movement and
the German
Social Democratic Party.
she notes with favor the critical
role of Luxemburg's Polish- Jewish peer-group in
maintaining
a source of the revolutionary spirit in the
20th century.

Of Luxemburg, Arendt writes that "even in her own
world
of the European socialist movement she was a rather
marginal

figure, with relatively brief moments of splendor and great

brilliance ..."[ 22

]

Like other conscious pariahs Arendt

reflects upon, she remarks that Rosa's role in the movement
and the party was little recognized, and thus after her
death,

she remained a misunderstood figure in the history of

Polish socialism.

Arendt discounts most of the popularized

accounts of Rosa's life, preferring to understand it through
the context of the pariah.

Luxemburg, Arendt notes, was an unorthodox Marxist who
sought above all else to improve existing world conditions

which "offended her sense of justice and

f reedom

.

"

[

23

]

Her

support for revolution stemmed from her moral commitment to
improve conditions for working people.

compelled Luxemburg to lead

a life

This commitment

in the public realm,

wedded to the destiny of the world and to socialist
political possibilities.

Her interest was not only in the
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working class, but in the larger world context
of

a

European

politics, and how the working class might fit
into the world
scene.
Arendt praises Luxemburg for attempting to transcend
nai row,

nationalistic boundaries and for going beyond an
exclusive concern with the working class to advance a

republican program" for the German and Russian socialist
parties, which Arendt notes, was an idea that only

strengthened her pariah position .[ 24
The Polish-Jewish peer-group which nurtured Luxemburg

captures most of Arendt'

s

attention.

The peer-group, says

Arendt, embodies the revolutionary spirit which she believes
has been a long neglected facet of Luxemburg's life.
like Arendt

's

Much

own peer group described by Young-Bruehl

Luxemburg's circle consisted of secular, middle-class Jews

with German cultural and intellectual backgrounds.

Arendt

writes that Luxemburg's peer group shared similar political
affinities, common moral standards, and

stood outside all social ranks, Jewish or
non-Jewish, hence had no conventional prejudices
whatsoever, and had developed, in this truly
splendid isolation, their own code of honor -which then attracted a number of non- Jews .[ 25

Arendt suggests that this moral code gave the group
of legitimacy and credibility.

In the same vein,

a

kind

she

asserts that Rosa's family, which did not have strong

socialist leanings, risked everything to support her.

This

unique Jewish family background was a formative influence on
the moral code of the peer group.

Such a demonstration of

89

moral allegiance represents an unconditional
trust and what
Arendt refers to as "moral taste," or the kind
of ethical
code that formed the core of Rosa's beliefs.

The code

possessed principles of equality, "mutual respect and
unconditional trust,

a

universal humanity and

a

genuine,

almost naive contempt for social and ethnic distinctions

were taken for granted.

"[ 26

was "home" to Rosa;

supported her and provided her with

it

The world of the peer group

]

a

sense of solidity.

This background, often unnoticed by critics, is the

framework against which the peer group spurned societally

mandated distinctions and prejudices to create an opposition
to conventional society and politics.

Rosa built her

socialist vision from the richness of her peer group and
milieu.

But despite her humanism, she maintained an

aversion to the women's emancipation movement.

Her distaste

is striking during an era in which many progressive women

were drawn into the movement.

Like Arendt

'

s

own views on

women's equality, Luxemburg believed that maintaining social

differences between men and" women was a good thing, making
her

a

pariah among progressive women.

But Arendt concedes

that Luxemburg's outsider status was "not only because she
was and remained
a

a

Polish Jew in

a

country she disliked and

party she came soon to despise, but also because she was

woman. "[27]

Thus, Arendt

'

s

women pariahs bear

pariah strain because they are women.

a

further

a
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A pariah status is felt more intensely
by women because
as women,

they have extremely limited access to anything

even remotely resembling

a

public space.

For Varnhagen and

Luxemburg, the salon and party respectively,
provided

alternative public spaces in which they could create
and

participate in the discourse of their particular eras.
Varnhagen'

s

case,

In

it is very significant that she initiated

the idea of a salon in her home.

Unable to participate in

and experience the world, Varnhagen brought the world to
her,

and with her limited experience she fashioned a world

out of individuals, who like her, were shunned by

conventional society.

in creating a pariah society

Varnhagen and her associates established
belonging.

a

place of

The salon enlarged her experience and provided a

space in which to act.

In her private capacity,

lacking in

status as both a pariah and a woman, Varnhagen chose to act
and to affirm the critical traits of the pariah

consciousness, extending them to create an alternative
space.

The salon transcended the narrow boundaries of the

conventional society that shunned the pariah, and encouraged
independent and free thinking.
discussed, and debated.

Ideas were circulated,

Political action's vigorous

interplay of differences and opinions emerges within this
context
Similarly, Luxemburg's pariah politics in the SPD

provided

a

forum for her entry into socialism and an

opportunity to press demands on behalf of the downtrodden.
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Luxemburg emerged as

a

leader of her party, something that

might never have been possible in
party.

conventional political

a

Her moral fervor and commitment to promoting
the

cause of world socialism, constitute her decision
to act in
the world.
Her decision was a choice made against

isolation, passivity, and estrangement from the world.

The

choice she made to act and to resist, has something
in

common with Arendt's theory of political action.

Although

Luxemburg sought to alleviate human suffering and
degradation, which for Arendt is clearly an anti-political
impulse, she remains an example of

a

conscious pariah.

Despite this tendency, Arendt suggests that Luxemburg's life
was committed both to action and to preserving the

revolutionary spirit, and morally praiseworthy because of
her grounding in the Polish peer-group.

While Arendt credits Luxemburg's and the Polish peergroup's continuous opposition to existing political and
social arrangements, she criticizes Luxemburg's late

acknowledgment that the "secret of this defiance was willful

noninvolvement with the world at large and singleminded

preoccupation with the growth of the Party
organization.

"[ 28

]

Arendt interprets this willful non-

involvement with the world as

a

distinct loss of the world.

Despite her criticism, Arendt links Luxemburg's maintenance
of constant friction with society to the preservation of the

revolutionary spirit, which she also associates with the
pariah.

Luxemburg's support for continuous opposition to
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society provides us with the idea of the pariah
consciously
choosing to act defiantly by spurning society,
rather than
being spurned.
In this way, the pariah "steals"
the

prerogative of society by snubbing it, and by providing
critique of existing conditions.

a

Luxemburg's belief in

maintaining constant friction with society

is

the concept of the conscious pariah itself,

grounded in

and in her moral

commitment, which is both an inherent part of her pariah

identity and

a

"gift" from the peer-group.

The pariah's

heightened sensitivity and awareness of societally mandated
discrimination and prejudice engenders
against it.

a

defiant reaction

The pariah's perspective on the idea of

resistance to society stems directly from

a

moral commitment

to opposing any kind of oppression.

Arendt's essays on Rahel Varnhagen and Rosa Luxemburg
are attempts to come to terms with two complicated women.

Her characterizations constitute

a

project of reclaiming and

recognizing the pariah in various manifestations.
views Varnhagen

's

Arendt

and Luxemburg's experiences and life

stories as artifacts that contribute to the world.

Their

lives provided what sense of immortality mere mortals can

hope for in the way they experienced the world, in their
deeds and words.

Arendt herself becomes

a

chronicler of

immortalizing action in her narrratives on Varnhagen and
Luxemburg.

She contributes to the story of action by re-

creating Varnhagen'

s

life story as she might have told it

and lays bare unacknowledged facts about Luxemburg in an
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effort to make both live on in memory.

This effort is

Arendt's understanding of action, storytelling
and
remembrance.
Thus, Varnhagen's and Luxemburg's

lives

constitute stories about the importance of identity.

For

Arendt, both Varnhagen and Luxemburg were conscious
pariahs

because they lived what they were given, affirmed
their
identities, and attempted to build

"home" in which they

a

could act freely.

That Varnhagen and Luxemburg were women does not escape
Arendt

,

but she does not hold them up as examples for the

cause of feminism.

Illustrating women as specifically

political beings was not Arendt's central concern, though
she considered the facts of their lives, such as Varnhagen's

lack of sophistication, beauty, and wealth as political
givens, not irrelevant personal data. [29]

Arendt thought of

women's issues in terms of her distinction between the

political and the social; she felt that they should be part
of a larger political struggle and opposed efforts to

establish the demands of women as an interest group.

In a

similar vein, Rosa Luxemburg felt that the oppression of
women, like that of Jews, would cease with the advent of

genuine socialism.
c.

Arendt's Political Identity

.

Having established

Varnhagen and Luxemburg as representatives of the pariah
tradition,

I

believe that it is appropriate from now on to

refer to the pariah as

a

"she."

It is also necessary to

become briefly acquainted with Arendt's understanding of
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identity.

Arendt's emphasis on care for the world expressed

through action is essentially an identity forming activity.
Also crucial to her concept of political action is

disclosure of unique identity.
is a

a

public

While the pariah's identity

collective one, it is not, according to Arendt's

schema,

automatically public, and therefore not political

unless there is access to the public space.

In such a

space, the actor has the opportunity to disclose a specific

and individual identity through words and deeds which are

recorded as stories and historical narratives.

Through

their preservation, the actor attains what little sense of

immortality a human being can possess.
Two, the actor becomes a

As stated in Chapter

distinct "who" as opposed to

a

"what," an assemblage of qualities that are reducible and

quantifiable, and therefore reproducible, only by means of

political action.

Of the "who", Arendt says,

This disclosure of "who" in contradistinction to
"what" somebody is -- his qualities, gifts, talents,
and short-comings, which he may display or hide -is implicit in everything somebody says and does.
It can be hidden only in complete silence and perfect passivity, but its disclosure can almost never
be achieved as a willful purpose, as though one
possessed and could dispose of this "who" in the
same manner he has and can dispose of his
qualities 30
.

[

The "who" is one of a kind, while the "what" consists of

various personality traits that are mass defined and

produced such as emotions, passions, and interests which
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belong exclusively to an individual's inner life.

The

"what" has nothing whatsoever to do with the
public realm.

Arendt maintains.
The moment we want to say who somebody is, our
very vocabulary leads us astray into saying what
he is; we get entangled in a description of qualities he necessarily shares with others like him;
we begin to describe a type or a "character" in'
the old meaning of the word, with the result that
his specific uniqueness escapes us. [31]

The "who" is key for Arendt because she believes that the

route to political action is through an assertion and

disclosure of unique identity, and not in laying bare
private aspects of

a

self that can never be known.

To

become a "who" through politics is for Arendt the highest
existential opportunity.
If we can know the "who" publicly,

Arendt is not as

hopeful for the properties of the "what."

She disdains

modern subjectivity and is disparaging of psychoanalytic
claims that we can know ourselves

.[

32

]

She argues that we

can never know the self and that a search for self-knowledge

yields self-hate and self-alienation.

Yet this view

presents the following difficulty: the pariah undoubtedly
undergoes an intense, inner deliberation process in

confronting the issue of identity.
searching seems unavoidable.

The pariah's soul-

But what kind of identity will

the pariah embrace: the socially ambitious parvenu or the

pariah resister?

Will the pariah become an ardent Zionist

nationalist, or the rebellious critic of society?
It would seem that the pariah, by virtue
of her

outoider status and unceasing battle over identity,
would
travel the treacherous route in search of self-knowledge
everyday.

Or perhaps, more accurately, the conscious pariah

actually struggles with self-def inition while the

parvenu/assimilationist pariah runs away from such struggles

by escaping from Jewish identity.

But perhaps the

consciousness of the conscious pariah is different from the

self-knowledge that Arendt disdains because its critical
content focuses outwardly on society, rather than

concentrating in an inward and self-destructive manner.

The

conscious pariah's awareness and sensitivity are directed

toward how she might fit into the world and contribute to
it.

In contrast,

the self -conscious pariah concentrates

energy inwardly on how she can change herself in order to

conform to existing societal norms.

The conscious pariah

somehow achieves the delicate balance required to be
conscious, without being destructively self -conscious in the

way Arendt disdains.
d

.

Unity or Disunity between the Pariah and Action ?

In some ways the pariah's sensibilities are similar to the

properties of action.

Like the actor, the pariah takes

courageous and independent positions, responds with

a

new

and often alternative perspective to the unexpected, and is

unfettered by biases, preconceived notions and interests.
Also like the actor, the pariah attempts to make

a

break
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with the old and encourage something
new and unprecedented,
and ultimately larger than herself.
Both individuals
envision a "whole,” in which a new set of
arrangements and
thinking further a respect and esteem for the
world.
Both
the actor and the pariah become caretakers
of the world.
However, while both the pariah and the actor
are bold
and visionary, the pariah's role is more
prophetic and

defiant.

The pariah is morally bound to resist oppression

by rebelling against it wherever it exists, while the
actor's moral obligation manifests itself in
and respect for the world,

amor mundi

.

a

basic love

And this may be the

most important factor that separates the pariah from the
actor.

The pariah is especially bound to

a

moral framework

because of a direct experience of oppression and injustice.
By contrast, the Arendtian actor is not inherently obligated
to follow a code of political and moral resistance.

Ideally, her actor acts in accordance with amor mundi which
is

morally suggestive, but not strictly compelling.
The strongest argument against the pariah becoming an

actor emerges within Arendt’s own theory, by virtue of her

continual emphasis on preventing private traits from

entering the public realm where they may become fodder for
politics.

In Arendt's view,

these private traits which

include introspection and its corrollary, self-absorption
are dangerously corrupting if they infiltrate the public

realm.

For the pariah, the distinction between the

political and the social manifests itself in the strict non-
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admission of self-conscious practices into
the public space
which, according to Arendt, do not encourage
the growth of a
political identity.

Arendt

'

s

critique of introspection, which is reflected

in her portrait of Rahel Varnhagen, weakens
the likelihood

of a relationship between the pariah and action.

Her

critiques of compassion and self-absorption also provide
ample evidence of pariah characteristics and private traits

which prevent political participation.

Arendt believes that

compassion destroys the worldly distance between people that
sustains the world and political action; it is politically
"

irrelevant and without consequence.

"

[33

that the content of political action,

]

Arendt argues

"talkative and

argumentative interest in the world is entirely alien to
compassion, which is directed solely, and with passionate
intensity, towards suffering man himself

[34

Kateb argues that Rahel Varnhagen is Arendt'

s

"most

extended meditation on the existential inadequacy of the
inner life. "[35]

Arendt

'

s

narrative on Rahel Varnhagen

'

life illustrates how introspection and the interiorized

world of self-consciousness ensure obfuscation of an
authentic self, thereby tending to obstruct the process of

accessing and affirming the self through participation in
the world.

Kateb underscores Arendt

'

s

concern with

introspection and self-knowledge: "There is another kind of

self-absorption equally fatal to the political realm... That
is the concern of the self with the self,

with its own

inwardness. "[36]

Since Arendt believes that we can never

know the self she naturally thinks that "trying
to be
fulfilled in one's inner process is to misspend
one's
life. "[37]

This,

essentially, describes Rahel Varnhagen and

the Platonic philosopher.

Arendt

s

concern with introspection stems from its

promoting the appearance of unlimited power in isolation
from the world and reality.

Indifference to the world is

the consequence of introspection,

becomes a shrine.

in which the inner self

She states:

If thinking rebounds back upon itself and finds
its solitary object within the soul -- if, that is,
it becomes introspection

—

it distinctly produces
semblance of unlimited power by the very act
of isolation from the world... it also sets up a
bastion in front of the one 'interesting' object:
the inner self.
in the isolation achieved by introspection thinking becomes limitless because it
is no longer molested by anything exterior; because there is no longer any demand for action.
Even the blows of fate can be escaped by flight
into the self
38
.

.

.a

.

.

.

.

[

In this state of mind everything has already been

anticipated, thus foreclosing any possibility of spontaneous
action; political action cannot occur where everything has

been foretold. For Arendt, introspection spawns protective
generalities without foundation, instead of truth and

understanding of experience.

These generalities do not

reveal the person, or the "who," but signal

personality and the "what."

a

descent into

According to Arendt, meaningful

political activity cannot occur in

a

public realm tainted
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with emotions and feelings and

a

self-conscious, uncertain

identity.

Arendt maintains that the protective
"comfort"
of introspection poses a threat to
political action

in its

preoccupation with the inauthentic self.
In contrast to the introspective pariah,

the Arendtian

actor finds a complete identity and becomes
individuated

through

a

action.

commitment to

a

political way of life through

This occurs only through

a

distinct loss of self or

the "what," rather than in obsession with it.

Rosa

Luxemburg is the most obvious manifestation of the conscious
pariah

s

commitment to

a

political way of life.

represents a selfless public figure,
whose identity as

a

a

Luxemburg

political person

"who," an authentic self, emerged in her

political practices.
But Arendt remains concerned about the pariah's

inwardness and acute sensitivity to humanity which raises

her fears about the human heart, the seat of suffering and
compassion.

Of the French Revolution she says,

"Where

passion, the capacity for suffering, and compassion, the

capacity for suffering with others, ended, vice began. "[39]
Arendt defines the heart as
a place of darkness which... no human eye
can penetrate; the qualities of the heart
need darkness and protection against the
light of the public to grow and remain what
they are meant to be, innermost motives which
are not for public display. [40]
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To the adage "Know Thyself" Arendt would
say,

"Thyself

cannot be known, motives and goals cannot be
foretold or
anticipated." The idea of the heart as a guide to
action is
preposterous to Arendt; action is its own guide and
its own
end
e

*

The Relationship between the Pariah and Action

Kateb's analysis suggests that

a

.

potential actor must live

outside the self where an authentic identity and self will
emerge.

This identity is forged by participating in the

world, therefore, a commitment to

must be made.

l_f

a

political way of life

the pariah can live life in this way,

there is a chance for participation.

Arendt's analysis

suggests that the pariah is capable of making

a

commitment

to living outside the narrow confines of the self, but not

always willing.

Her analysis in the "The Jew As Pariah: A

Hidden Tradition" of Bernard Lazare's attempt to instill the
pariah with a consciousness of her condition notes, "The
decisive factor was not the parvenu ... Immeasurably more
serious and decisive was the fact that the pariah refused to

become a rebel. "[41]
Also in this vein, Kateb speaks of Arendt's pairing of
freedom and worldliness as key to the emergence of genuine

political action, and thus,

a

route to participation.

commitment to worldliness, however, must first be
established; that is,

a

life outside introspection.

Underscoring Arendt's emphasis on worldliness, Kateb
maintains

The
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To live outside oneself and for the sake
of acting from a principle is to live freely,
free of the necessities of body, heart, and mind.
To live with others loyal to the same or to a
ffsrent principle is to live in a free world. 42

In relation to the pariah,

]

Kateb's interpretation of Arendt

implies that the pariah can participate if she takes an

interest in the world and the risk of a life outside
introspection.

The question then, becomes whether or not

the pariah is capable and willing to make a commitment to

worldliness, and whether she can be free enough of "body,
heart, and mind" in order to cast her lot with the world.
The pariah's commitment to worldliness emerges in the
form of a resistence to oppression and injustice.

By

choosing to act on the awareness of oppression and
discrimination, the pariah's worldliness comes to light.

In

choosing to emerge from the darkness of the self by acting
on a moral principle, the pariah joins others in caring for
the world.

Thus,

in addition to this moral commitment,

the

pariah's speech and storytelling abilities, as well as the
founding of alternative spaces all constitute

a

connection

between the pariah and action.
The challenge where the pariah is concerned is to

participate in the public realm and to contribute something
to sustaining the world.

But does the pariah cease to be

pariah if the commitment to worldliness is made?

a

This

question hinges on the assumption that the elements which
exclude the pariah are the same ones that make the pariah

a
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pariah.

According to Botstein this challenge

is

overcome,

or at least negotiated, by infusing
the pariah's capacity
for speech, storytelling, creation of
alternative spaces,

and resistance to oppression, into the
public realm.

These

pariah contributions, gifts to the world, in
their own way,
constitute political action and correspond to
Arendt’s idea
of a political community.

Affirming the positive aspects of

the pariah identity by admitting them into the
public space,

leaving behind the lack of status and sense of social
inferiority, do not necessarily mean that the pariah ceases
to be a pariah.

On the contrary, the pariah's sense of

collective identity is enriched by an affirmation that

materializes and is validated publicly.

With this

affirmation, the problem of the pariah's lack of status

—

political, legal, and social, would be left behind.

Leon Botstein’
The Jews,

s

essay "Liberating The Pariah: Politics,

and Hannah Arendt" provides support for

relationship between the pariah and action.
that a shift takes place in Arendt

critical view of the private, to

a

'

s

a

Botstein argues

thought from

a

sharply

more sympathetic one that

lends support to the contribution of pariah characteristics
in the practice of political action.

Botstein argues that

Arendt "...saw, in America, the authentic prospect of

a

political life (as she conceived politics) for Jews. "[43]
She understood America as a place where Jews could appear as
Jews,

shedding the pariah's lack of status without
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discarding positive, secular European
pariah qualities,
the shift in Arendt's thought he
states,

of

The redefinition of politics in her
mature thought
permitted Arendt to believe she could
preserve
special character of the Jew while permitting
h
him to leave behind his pariah status
and
cipate as an equal with other free citizenspartiin
a pluralistic society. 44
]

Arendt's later thought frees the private traits
of the
pariah from the formerly pejorative sense with
which she

associated them, launching them formally into the
public
realm.

Botstein maintains that her emphasis on individual

speech and action "could allow

a

particular Jewish

character, originally developed in pariah conditions to
cont inue

.

"

[

45

He argues that Arendt envisions

]

a

secular

Jewish culture in America, much like the European one that
she left behind.

Botstein asserts that her interpretation

of post-Emancipation era anti-semitism, the European Jewish

secular tradition, Jewish nationalism, and American
politics, culminate to establish the "origins" of her theory
of action.

Speech and thought constitute the bridge between the

private sphere and the public realm for the pariah.

Arendt speech

jis

political action and also

a

For

pariah skill

which can contribute to the restoration of politics.
Arendt, Botstein advances, believes that Jewish political
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participation in

confederation of peoples could eradicate
pariah status without destroying the
uniqueness of secular
European culture. Botstein underscores the
significance of
language to participation in the Arendtian
political
community,
a

A political renaissance for modernity which
utilized the traditions of the Jewish pariah became
Arendt s normative objective for collective life
in the modern world.
if political action could~be
centered on the use of language, the once pariah
European Jew could emerge as an exemplar of political

participation

.

[

46

According to Botstein, the pariah's contribution to
political action is language; through language the pariah is
individuated, and connected at the same time to the public
realm and action.

Through speech, the pariah contributes to

the restoration and reinvigoration of politics and the

revolutionary spirit.

In effect, Arendt transfers the

exceptional elements of Jewish history and pariah culture
and places them into a political context where they are

generalized.

Botstein says, "The European history of the

Jewish pariah, the legacy of a nation without a home or
politics, became in Arendt political action in the ideal;
the Jewish experience generalized.

accurate, the pariah establishes
action,

a

"[ 47

]

If this is

solid relationship with

in which pariah characteristics are infused into the

public realm, and the lack of status which marked her
earlier,

is left behind.
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CHAPTER IV

CONCLUDING REMARKS
A

‘

ionsh ip between the Pariah and Action

ft

The comments of Arendt and others on the
pariah suggest

that neither an "escape'' through assimilation,
nor a total

reconciliation of Jewish identity are likely.

For Arendt,

escape through assimilation, and exclusion in
the form of
Zionist nationalism represent two extremes, both
fraught

with difficulties.

The pariah identity is worked through

precariously, at best.

Arendt 's views suggest that living

with the contradictions and the inherent ambiguities may

provide some direction in the pariah's search for
status.

a

home and

Embracing the contradictions may foster the

critical inquiry and engagement that promotes an interest in
the world and political action.

This critical engagement

emerges in the conscious pariah's resistance to the

oppression of conventional society.
Though it would appear that Arendt

community is quite restrictive,
claim that

a

political

s

believe it is plausible to

relationship exists between the pariah and

Although Arendt does not posit the existence of

action.

such

a

I

'

relationship, there is evidence to suggest that her

concept of the pariah informs her theory of action.

pariah can be seen as
Arendt

's

a

participant, and

a

The

leader in

political community even though it is both elusive

and restrictive.

The pariah's compatibility with action as

Ill

defined and characterized by Arendt,
hinges largely on the
faculty of speech which, in her terms,
constitutes political
action
In Arendt,

one can also get a good idea about
what

constitutes the political by understanding what
it excludes.
The excluded elements manifest themselves
in the

introspective side of the pariah which, if admitted
to the
public space, thwart the kind of authentic politics
Arendt
envisions.
The pariah as pariah, that is, the pariah
who

fails to become a conscious pariah,

Arendt

s

public realm.

is excluded from

Her politics does not give the

pariah who fails to become conscious of her position, and to
nurture this consciousness in the form of resistance and
'-'^’itigue,

an opportunity to join the public space.

Arendt 's

hope for the pariah's affirmative and critical qualities

outweighs her concern over the potential encroachment of

introspection and the other self-oriented traits into the
public realm.

The conscious pariah's moral grounding,

a

capacity for critique through the preservation of distance,

expression through language, and a willingness to confront
and resist oppression, all contribute to the enlivening of

Arendt’s political action.
of personality,

Arendt’

s

concerns with aspects

and introspective self-searching invading

the space of action, can be held at bay to consider the

pariah's positive characteristics.

That is, those which are

compatible with action, are world-enhancing, and which make

11

positive contribution to the sustenance
and enrichment of
the public space.
a

In Chapter Three,

I

have outlined in some detail the

elements of the pariah's identity which
are compatible with
the properties of action.
I have discussed the pariah's
unique moral grounding and commitment which
are instrumental
factors in acts of resistance to oppression.
These acts,
are in fact,

forms of action.

But do the responses offered

thus far resolve the problem that this study sets
out to

explore?

Namely, can the problem of the pariah,

a

lack of

public space and feeling of caring for the world, two
elements which Arendt values highly, be resolved by

providing the pariah an opportunity to participate in the
public space?

My response to this question is yes, the

pariah will find

a

home in the world if she first becomes

attuned and conscious to her lack of status.

Once this

consciousness is secured, the affirmative and critical
pariah traits can be understood while the negative ones can
be left behind.

if the pariah acknowledges her plight as

political, there is

a

chance for participation in Arendt’

vision of the public space.

Participation may also come in

the form of small alternative, non-mainstream, public

spaces,

something altogether different from what Arendt

envisions.

But it is clear that only with the cultivation

of a critical consciousness does the pariah have any hope of

acting in the Arendtian sense.

The pariah's continuous

opposition to, and critique of injustice and oppression
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emerge even more powerfully once she
claims

legitimate and

a

authentic stake in the public space.

Within Arendt

'

s

work,

the connection between the

pariah's speech and action culminates in the
conversation
and storytelling of the salon.
in the political space of
the salon,

these acts of narrativity and discourse,
recovery

and remembrance, allow the story of the authentic
self to be
told.

This story, told in the presence of others, becomes

the story of action,

an example of a life projected into the

world rather than an experience of estrangement and
withdrawal.

Through the action of storytelling, an

individual's unique identity is illuminated.

It is Arendt'

belief that we glean meaning and understanding from these
stories of identity.

The disclosure of unique identities in

the public space also ensures and protects the notion of

difference, an important concept for Arendt.

The pariah's

distinctive character traits, those which affirm

a

critical

identity, are preserved and projected into the public space.

While the pariah's collective, and public identities emerge
in spaces like the salon,

the pariah's individual identity

also appears, thus working further toward ensuring the

preservation of difference in the political community.

The

relationship between the pariah and action manifests itself
when the pariah's introspection gives way to

understanding of self and world.

a

new

For Arendt this new

understanding emerges through storytelling and language
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which are the relation of experience
and understanding, and
essentially, public acts of disclosure.
With the extension of pariah traits
into Arendt
public space and speech as political action,
the pariah's
identity is affirmed and accepted as one
among others.
As
'

I

stated earlier, this does not necessarily
imply that the
pariah is no longer a pariah upon entry into
political life.
The pariah's collective identity remains intact.
Formed
through

a

common history and experience, it is an identity

shared with others of similar backgrounds and
inheritances.
The positive characteristics of the pariah identity
adhere

and are accentuated in the public space, but the negative
status changes.

This negative status is shed for an

enlargement and a generalization of the positive features of
the pariah identity.

The pariah finds

a

home either in the

construction of alternative public spaces or in the
conventional political arena where she continues to function
as a gadfly and a critical resister.

Botstein comments that

Arendt generalizes the pariah experience, extending its

significance until it comes to play a critical role in
political life.

It is possible to see Arendt transposing

affirmative pariah qualities to the public realm where they
contribute to its growth and enrichment.

Arendt seeks to

bring the pariah into the world without fundamentally
changing the positive traits in her character.

Botstein'

remarks suggest that the pariah's essential character is not
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compromised by participation in the public
realm, and that
on the contrary, it flourishes in a
diverse community.
Arendt's Rahel Varnhagen

— Pariah

'

,

her Jewish essays in The Jew

and The Origins of Totalitarianism

work on political action.

,

precede her

These formative writings on the

pariah and related themes contribute significantly
to her
later formulation of the theory of action.
Botstein

argues

that Arendt's depiction of speech as political action
was

made by way of her study and understanding of the Jewish

question.

The Jews' quest throughout the modern era for

freedom from prejudice and

a

cessation of their experience

of powerlessness are significant to her theory of action.

Her concern with the statelessness, worldlessness

,

and

homelessness of the Jewish people stems from her interest in
securing them legitimate political and legal identities

during the pre- and post-WW II eras in Europe.
a

For Arendt,

truly human individual cares for the world and contributes

to its artifacts by participating in political, hence,

worldly acts.

Only by acknowledging the legitimacy and

worth of these identities did Arendt think that the pariah
would be able to assume
to public life.

into,

stake in maintaining

a

commitment

A legitimate status is gained by entering

and participating in the affairs of the world, which

for Arendt,

action

a

are first steps toward the exercise of political
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B

Pariah:

-

Political Outsider or Political TnsirW ?

If it is plausible to claim as

study,

I

have throughout this

that the concept of the pariah
informs Arendt's

theory of action it is, then, reasonable
to advance that
this concern can be extended to the
problem of political
outsiders more generally. Her overriding
concern with the
sustenance of amor mundi and the preservation
of worldliness
suggests that finding points of access and entry
into the

world for the pariah and the political outsider
is
desirable and appropriate activity.
for speech,

a

The pariah's capacity

storytelling, critique, moral sense, and

resistance to injustice contribute to

a

more enlivened

political community, if put into practice in the public
space.

In order to gain legitimacy and status, the pariah

must employ these capacities, or remain
social outsider.

a

political and

Though Arendt's idea of citizenship and

leadership are limited, her work suggests that the pariah
need not remain

a

political outsider.

Arendt's political

vision, her reading of the American founding, and

interpretation of what Israel could be, all point to her
interest in creating access to the public realm for the
pariah.

The possibility of the pariah's contribution to,

and enrichment of the public space are every bit as

important to her theory as action itself.

Her concept of

political action is meaningless without actors, the agents
who bear a responsibility for carrying out the public

business
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The pariah's moral responsibility
would be

a

welcome

complement to, and enhancement of the
Arendtian actor, who
as agent, acts without regard
to outcome.
Without a moral
commitment, this actor bears no responsibility
for the

action.

The only way out of this dilemma, as

earlier,

is to acknowledge Arendt's commitment
to the world

(amor mundi

)

,

I

discussed

as an inherently moral one that her
actors are

predisposed and wedded to.

But for those who still find

morality lacking in her sense of action,

I

would argue that

the pariah's moral underpinnings can be considered
a real

contribution to the practice of political action.
In the public space,

the pariah gains status and

legitimate standing in the political community while

managing to retain the positive traits which characterize
her unique collective identity,

while the pariah's lack of

status outside the public space and unique, collective

identity combine to make the pariah

a

pariah, Arendt clearly

favors discarding this negative status and affirming

positive pariah traits through the practice of political
action.

These characteristics which make up the collective

identity of the pariah, contribute to the diversity and

quality of political discourse.

Except for acquiring

a

legitimate status, the pariah's essential nature and

identity remains unchanged.
space,

As a new member of the public

the pariah retains the memory of her previous lack of

status which helps to ensure a continued critique from a

point inside the public space.
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Botstein's comments point to Arendt

preservation of

a

1

s

concern with the

collective pariah identity by admitting

the pariah into public life.

The extension of pariah traits

into the public realm would encourage the
specifically

Jewish European, secular character that Arendt
speaks of to
continue, its existence guaranteed through the
pariah's

participation in political action.

Arendt wants the

particular collective identity and character of the
pariah
to take root in a public life that ensures a
diversity of

collective and individual identities.

According to

Botstein, Arendt's theory of action constitutes an extension
of the Jewish pariah experience into a universal norm.

While the pariah experience of speech, thought, and critical

inquiry is nurtured in conditions unique to the political
outsider, these conditions can also be created inside the

public space.

Arendt's political community seems not to

take the pariah out of the pariah, so to speak, but to

generate and enlarge the possibilities for the emergence of
unique identities through action.
Like the dissidents and former political outsiders who

currently lead the newly emerging democracies and multiparty systems in Eastern and Central Europe, Arendt's
conscious pariahs participate in and become leaders in
public life.

Once outsiders, banned, persecuted, and

interrogated, these pariahs have become leading figures in
their countries' new governments.

Given the current

dynamics and political openings in these countries, which
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have no longstanding democratic and
pluralistic traditions,
Arendt's concept of the pariah and its
contemporary

relevance are considerable.
In her essay "The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden
Tradition,"

Arendt characterizes four individuals whose lives
and works
exemplify the plight of the conscious pariah: they
are

Bernard Lazare, Heinrich Heine, Charlie Chaplin, and
Franz
Kafka.

Of the four, the plight of Kafka's character "K.,"

in The Castle

pariahs,

most resembles the current situations of

,

former opposition members who now find themselves

cast in the role of political leaders.

Arendt notes that

Castle is the only Kafka novel in which the hero is

clearly Jewish, and though he is not marked by any

specifically Jewish attribute, his struggle dramatizes the
typical plight of the assimilationist
he is neither

.

K's dilemma is that

member of the village, nor does he belong to

a

the Castle: put simply, he "fits" nowhere.

characterizes

K.

Arendt

as Kafka's man of goodwill who struggles to

attain basic human rights and to determine his own destiny
in a difficult situation.

He wishes for no special

dispensations from the Castle, and he refuses to accept the
villagers'

superstitions.

K.

thinks for himself and makes

his own way along the ambiguous path toward assimilation on
his own terms.

rights becomes

One man's life and struggle for basic human
a

symbol for the villagers.

After he dies,

they realize that they, too, can insist on their human
rights and dignity.
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The plight of

K.

shares something in common with the

paiiah as dissident in the contemporary
political

configurations in Eastern and Central Europe.

The new

government leaders in these countries are
attempting to
build a respect for human rights into their
societies.

They

are attempting to show people who are used
to accepting

their fates blindly, who had little or no recourse
against
the things that happened to them, that they have
the right
to expect more and that they are ultimately,

the health of their societies.

responsible for

Most importantly, the pariah

leaders maintain that the corruption and lies with which

people have lived for years, must be cleansed from political
life in order for them to believe that they do have

a

real

stake in the decision-making processes of government.

The

vast majority of people in these countries have little

experience in establishing a democratic system of government
and are learning that building a democracy takes work; it
takes time to establish legitimacy.
1

•

The Pariah's Changing Critique

Perhaps it is true that the nature of the pariah's

critique changes in countries where dissidents, members of
the opposition and underground are now holding power in

their new, or soon to be elected governments.

How could

their critique not be affected when at one time, as

outspoken dissidents and opposition members, they were
imprisoned for their views?

Vaclav Havel's example

illustrates the dramatic revolution of a pariah who has

risen to the ranks of the new
political leadership in his
country in just a few months after
being released from
prison.
Havel is a pariah, who in Arendt s
terms, helped
create the new public space and also very
much retains his
pariah features.
The consequence is a change in status
for
everyone who was oppressed by the Communist
system and a
'

growing understanding of democratic tools and
principles.
It is difficult to say how his critique
has changed as a

result of his change in position, but there
is little doubt
that the memory of one's pariah experience cannot
easily be

erased or forgotten.

Havel and other leading dissidents,

once political outsiders, now legitimate insiders,
maintain
a

consciousness of their former pariah statuses as new

leaders.

They also publicly affirm positive pariah

characteristics, legitimating them politically for everyone.
As a leader of a newly formed government, the

dissident's ideas and opinions are now legitimated through
the initiation of democratic processes and principles such
as human rights,

respect for law, and free, periodic

elections in which representatives are popularly elected.
These pariah leaders: dissident intellectuals, trade
unionists, artists, and former members of the underground,
cannot help but retain in memory what most people's lives
were like as indistinguishable drones in

communist system.
is self-alienation

a

one-party

The consequence of a country of pariahs
,

and an estrangement from the capacity to

establish and participate in some kind of nourishing public

life.

Such

pariah.

possibility does not exist for the
pariah as
The consequence of this same group
of people
a

resisting their oppression and forming new
parties and
governments, and pressing for democratic
reforms, is

that

all the various pariah peoples will
gain a legitimate

political status.
be,

The memory of what their lives used to

as well as the processes by which they
rebelled against

old ways, constitute the maintenance of the
pariah

consciousness.

The pariah's moral embeddedness and ethical

resistance are the key features that live on in this
consciousness.

The pariah as dissident's experience of

living without basic human rights and freedoms, being under
surveillance, being banned, labeled subversive,
interrogated, and generally, being oppressed in life and
work,

is a virtual guarantee that her basic character will

remain intact.
It is the preservation of the memory of this experience

that infuses morality into the new system and prevents its

possible corruption.

The nature of the dissident's critique

of the political system and the structure of society may

change as

a

result of an elevation in status, participation,

and leadership in the government, but the fact of its

existence and perpetuation are maintained.

Vigilance

through critique and opposition continue in the new
government, and coincide with Arendt's concept of amor
mundi, which requires the preservation of a certain kind of

distance of which both are a part.

Distance is embedded in

i

Arendt's notion of care for the world.
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And the pariah,

whether she assumes political leadership or not,
may never
feel completely comfortable in the world.
Critic James

Bernauer associates this sense of discomfort with
Arendt's
concept of amor mundi whose demands he claims
involve

"the

,

preservation of

a

certain distance, the willingness not to

conform, the permanent status of what Arendt called the

conscious pariah. "[1]

Thus,

as much as responsibility and

care for the world, distance and resistance are integral

elements of amor mundi.

The pariah's distance and

resistance foster critique and correspond to Arendt's notion
of caring for the world.

This is, perhaps, how the problem of the pariah is
resolved.

Arendt's concern for being situated in the world

and unestranged from it, is resolved by deploying the

affirmative characteristics of the pariah, and also by

understanding the notion of distance embedded in the concept
of amor mundi.
2
The Contemporary Significance of the Relationship
between the Pariah and Action
.

Arendt's elusive political community has an

otherworldly feel to it.

Her politics seems transcendent in

nature, its content, cultural and aesthetic and of a higher
order.

Her politics is distinctive in its bias against the

masses, who as masses, are incapable of participating in the

kind of political life she envisions.

portrait of

a

But Arendt paints

politics that in some way resembles the

collective face of today's dissident pariah leaders.

The

a
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leaders of the revolutionary people's
movements of 1989
turned out to be mostly members of the
intelligentsia:
students, professors, artists, poets,
writers, and

generally, members of the cultural literati.

These people

of letters and arts are very much in
keeping with Arendt’s

concept of the conscious pariah.

As caretakers,

instigators, and leaders, they have pursued the
vigorous

conversation of politics, debated over structure, laws,
and
constitutions.
They have engaged in political action which,
for Arendt,

as we have seen,

about political things.

is political speech or talk

These leaders have come out openly

as representatives of the pariah, who never before had
a

legitimate status or

Arendt

'

s

rightful place in affairs of state.

a

concept of the pariah as actor, viewed against the

background of the emerging politics of Eastern and Central
Europe (led by the dissident as pariah), presents an

interesting broadening of her original idea.

Viewed in this

way, the concept illustrates a further development and could

be creating an important precedent.

Botstein's comments suggest that the pariah's character
is not

compromised by

fact to the contrary,

a

is

move into the public realm, and in

enhanced by it.

And since Arendt

believes that freedom can only be experienced in politics,
it would seem implicit in her concern for the future

viability of the world, that the pariah must join the public
realm to help build, and experience authentic freedom.

Freedom only emerges where worldliness,

a

commitment to
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preserving the possibilities for action,
has taken root.
This argument provides further support
for the pariah's
relationship to action.
In Arendt

'

s

work, various elements of the pariah

identity manifest themselves differently within
different
pariahs.
While it is clear that she favors the conscious
pariah, who possesses

a

commitment to sustaining the

possibilities of political action through rebellion and
critique, both of her people and existing society, how
does

Arendt treat the different kinds of pariahs?

For example,

the conscious pariahs Bernard Lazare and Rosa Luxemburg

clearly, were very public and political figures, while Rahel

Varnhagen and poet Heinrich Heine were not.

There seem to

be different shades of the pariah identity which includes

both
a

a

collective sense, in terms of the Jewish people being

specifically pariah people, and a public sense, which

manifests itself in explicitly political acts such as

Luxemburg's socialism or Herzl's Zionism.

In the sense in

which Arendt speaks of it, the pariah's collective identity
is comprised of cultural,

critical elements.

artistic, moral, intellectual, and

Given access to the public realm, the

pariah can channel these elements of collective identity
into

a

public and political identity.

even though part of

a

The pariah as pariah,

collective identity, lacks political

status which she can only obtain through access to, and

cultivation of some type of public realm.

If the pariah

fails to muster the resolve and the awareness to critically

126

resist her situation, she possesses
little more than
private identity.

a

For Arendt, the pariah must become a
conscious pariah
in order to achieve a public, hence,
a political identity.
And herein lies the key: the public identity,
shored up by
sense of collective experience, is the most
significant

identity for Arendt.

a

Individuals' unique identities are

asserted in the public space where they become
political.
Arendt 's sense of the political and of legitimate
actors
as we have seen throughout this study,

at certain points appears inconsistent.

is,

quite restricted and
The shift that

takes place in her thought from an agonal to

a

more

participatory view of politics, and the blending of both of
these approaches, constitutes what appears to be an

inconsistency.

But despite these difficulties, Arendt

endows the conscious pariah with what she regards as

inherently political traits; those of speech, critique,
resistance, morality, justice, and impartiality.

Arendt

searches for a public identity for the pariah that extends

beyond an understanding of Jewish identity as simply
collective identity.

Arendt'

s

a

thought on the pariah

considers this collective identity in terms of, and in

relation to a political identity.

Her depiction of the way

in which Luxemburg's Polish peer-group was enriched by the

pariah's collective identity also illustrates how this

background encouraged and nurtured the formation of Rosa's
powerful political, i.e,, public identity.

There is,

1

therefore,

a

relationship between the pariah's collective

identity and the emergence of an authentic
political
identity.

in Arendt

1

s

portrait of Luxemburg, the pariah's

public identity manifests itself clearly.

Arendt

s

concern for the pariah's making

And therein,
a

commitment to

preserving future possibilities for political action comes
to fruition.

o

7
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